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Fair Housing Laws: A Critique
By JAMES P CHANDLER*
THE federal Fair Housing Act of 1968,1 like its predecessors, section
2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,2 the John F Kennedy Executive
Order3 and Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,4 may have been born
of political expediency, 5 but now policies embodied in those enactments
have received bipartisan political support.6 In 1971 President Nixon
said that:
Underlying our housing policies-and embodied in our laws and
our Constitution-are certain basic principles: Dental of equal
housing opportunity to a person because of race is wrong [and]
such demal will not be tolerated whether practiced directly and
overtly, or under cover of subterfuges, or indirectly through such
practices as price and credit discrimination.
This statement of national policy is the end product of an evolutionary
process which began over a century ago. It is this policy which federal
courts and agencies now seek to enforce.
The policy is of little practical value, however, without an effective
system of enforcement. The main thrust of the legislative effort has
now ebbed and the burden has fallen on courts and administrative agen-
* A.B., 1963, University of Califorma, Berkeley; J.D., 1970, University of
California, Davis; LL.M., 1971, Harvard; Assistant Professor of Law, University of
Maryland.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19, 3631 (1970).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
3. Exec. Order No. 11,063, 3 C.F.R. 652 (1959-63).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-I to -4 (1970).
5. Comment, The Federal Fair Housing Requirements: Title VIII of the 1968
Civil Rights Act, 1969 DuKn L.J. 733, 734 n.8 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Duke Com-
ment]; and Note, Discrimination in Employment and in Housing: Private Enforcement
Provisions of The Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968, 82 HARv. L. REv. 834, 835
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Note].
6. Compare S. 1026, H.L 5700, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1967 proposed by President Lyndon B. Johnson) with Statement
by President Richard M. Nixon on Federal Policies Relative to Equal Housing Oppor-
tunity, News Release, June 11, 1971.
7. Id. at 1.
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cies to carry out the policy. These bodies have acquired some experi-
ence in the four years since the Fair Housing Act was enacted, and it is
time to take a second look at the overall legislative scheme, as imple-
mented, with a view toward critically evaluating not only the scope of
the fair housing laws but also the efficacy of their enforcement proce-
dures.
In order to fully understand the current enforcement effort, it is
essential to understand the interaction of the legal and societal factors
that are mainly responsible for the conditions that the law aims to cor-
rect. Moreover, such an anlysis will permit a more informed appraisal
of the effectiveness of the law by testing its progress in correcting those
conditions.8 This article will therefore examine the evolution of na-
tional policy towards housing discrimination, the nature and extent of
such discrimination and the federal enforcement machinery designed to
eradicate it. This machinery will be evaluated for substantive and
structural effectiveness. Finally, although the fair housing laws are
largely effective in accomplishing their goals, proposals are set forth for
revisions in current legislation, principally in regard to scope and en-
forcement mechanisms of the Fair Housing Act, which will allow full
implementation of the policy of equal housing opportunity.'
Evolution of National Policy Against
Discrimination in Housing
The national policy against discrimination in housing has evolved
from little more than platitudes to a comprehensive set of laws that
provide an effective vehicle to curb this type of activity. Early enact-
ments have only recently been interpreted to bear significantly on the
opportunities available to persons who historically have been discrimi-
nated against in housing. Since the 1968 Fair Housing Act was an out-
growth of this developing policy of the national government, this analy-
sis begins with a cursory examination of this evolutionary process.
8. Policy words are important only insofar as they may be translated into living
reality. Thus an understanding of the potential for this transformation is possible only
from an understanding of the social condition that gave rise to the policy, and the na-
ture and extent of the social evil to which the policy is directed. If the evil is ade-
quately proscribed by law, and the legal mechanisms for the enforcement of those laws
are also adequate, there is a chance for the successful eradication of the evil. But in the
absence of either adequate proscriptions or enforcement mechanisms there is little
chance of success. By testing is meant the evaluation of the operational effectiveness
of both the proscriptions and enforcement mechanisms by measurement of the nature
and extent of the evil before and after the law, followed by an assessment of the en-
forcement effort irrespective of enforcement tools.
9. See text accompanying notes 252-305 infra.
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Early Developments
The federal government did not take an active part in the com-
try's housing market until 1934.10 The main purpose of this early in-
volvement, however, had nothing to do with solving discrimination in
housing. Rather, it was to revitalize the housing construction industry
and the home credit community.11 It is important to note that the be-
ginning of federal interest in housing occurred at a time when both
residential segregation and discrimination were broadly accepted by our
society. 2 Thus, during this period federal housing policies condoned,
encouraged and at times required discriminatory housing practices.13
For example, the 1936 edition of the Federal Housing Administra-
tion's (FHA) Underwriting Manual instructed its appraisers to make
sure that properties to be insured by the FHA would be protected from
"adverse influences" which included "the infiltration of business or in-
dustrial uses, lower class occupancy and inharmonious racial groups."' 4
This manual also furnished a model racial restrictive covenant which it
recommended for inclusion in all FHA insured real property deeds.'"
When land was sold to Negroes or Mexican-Americans, adjoining
properties generally would be classified as "uninsurable" by the FHA.'16
Moreover, private developers who proposed to build interracial housing
projects were subjected to a variety of obstructing and delaying tactics
by the FHA. 17 This chain of events allowed Assistant FHA Commis-
sioner W.J. Lockwood to state in November 1948 that "FHA has never
insured a housing project of mixed occupancy."'" The FHA policy was
essentially "separate for whites, nothing for blacks."'9 While this state-
10. National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-49 (1970). In 1937, a second
housing act was created which created the United States Housing Administration,
(predecessor of the Public Housing Administration) to assist in the construction of
low rent public housing projects. United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. §§
1401-03 (1970).
11. G. GRIER & E. GRIER, EQUALITY AND BEYOND: HOUSING SEGREGATION AND
THE GoALs OF THE GREAT SocIETy 53 (1966).
12. R. WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETro 69-76 (1948).
13. See G. GIER & E. GIER, supra note 11, at 54.
14. FEDERAL HousmG ADmiNsSTRATION, UNDERWRITING MANuAL If 935 (1938).
15. Id. 980.
16. C. ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS 236 (1955).
17. G. Grier, The Negro Ghettos and Federal Housing Policy, 32 L. & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 550, 554 (1967).
18. N. SRAus, Two-TImRs OF A NATION 221 (1955).
19. C. ABRAMS, supra note 16, at 237. This rather terse comment is substanti-
ated by subsequent empirical studies. By 1959 the Commission on Civil Rights esti-
mated that the FHA had written insurance on approximately five million homes and
on rental and co-op projects that housed some eight hundred thousand families.
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ment no longer characterizes any socially accepted standard, the fed-
eral policy of allowing local authorities to make decisions as to the loca-
tion and racial composition of public housing projects has resulted in
another form of segregated residential patterns.20 This fact seems to
indicate a lower echelon, but nonetheless official attempt to keep blacks
out of the suburbs. 1
The turning point in federal housing policies with regard to dis-
crimination was very slow in coming and it is difficult to give the event
a precise date. In 1948 the Supreme Court in Shelley v. Kraemer
22
held that racially restrictive covenants in private real estate deeds could
not be enforced through legal channels. In the following year Con-
gress established that a "decent home and a suitable living environment
for every American family" was to be a national goal of the federal hous-
ing programs.23  In response to the Supreme Court's decision in
Shelly, the FHA removed from its Underwriting Manual all references
to racially homogenous neighborhoods and racially restrictive cove-
nants.2 ' However, it was not until 1950 that the FHA ceased to in-
sure mortgages containing such covenants.
25
The 1950s were important years in the evolution of a national
policy regarding discrimination. It was during this period that the
UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 1959 REPORT 462 (1959) [hereinafter
cited as 1959 REPORT]. During the period 1935 to 1950 some fifteen million new
homes were constructed and federally approved restrictive covenants blanketed the na-
tion's developing suburban areas. G. GRIER & E. GRIER, supra note 11, at 55. In
1959, it was estimated that less than two percent of the new houses provided in the
post war years by FHA mortgage insurance had been available to minority group
members. UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, HOUSING 63 (1961) [hereinafter
cited as HOUSING]. Thus of the fifteen to twenty million new homes constructed be-
tween 1934 and 1959 only two percent were available to the nation's minorities who
make up approximately fifteen percent of the total population.
20. Ledbetter, Public Housing-A Social Experiment Seeks Acceptance, 32 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 490, 501 (1967). In 1963, seventy-eight percent of the 3,028 fed-
erally aided public housing projects in forty-five states were racially segregated.
TRENDS IN HOUSING (a publication of the National Comm. Against Discrimination in
Housing), Nov.-Dec., 1963, at 6.
21. As of 1966 out of 250,000 public housing units built in the twenty-four
largest metropolitan areas only seventy-six were located outside of the central cities.
W. TAYLOR, HANGING TOGETHER: EQUALITY IN AN URBAN NATION 92 (1971).
22. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
23. Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, § 2, 63 Stat. 413 (now 42 U.S.C. §§
1401-36 (1970)). Although this objective contained no express reference to the prob-
lem of racial discrimination, it was implicitly directed towards meeting that problem if
indeed it was to attain its announced goal. See note 19 supra.
24. G. GRIER & E. GRIER, supra note 11, at 57.
25. See HOUSING, supra note 19, at 25.
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FH-A, along with the Veterans Administration, ruled that all insured
properties acquired by them would be sold on a non-discriminatory
basis. 26 In 1954 the FHA instructed its local officers to take affirma-
tive steps to encourage the development of demonstration open occu-
pancy developments.
Despite these changes the FHA did little to abate the discrimina-
tory practices of builders and vendors of housing provided through
federal mortgage insurance. 28  The FHA did, however, begin to coop-
erate formally with state and local fair housing agencies. The first
such agreement was reached in New York in April of 1957.29 The
FHA agreed to suspend funds to any builder whom the fair housing
agency found guilty of discrimination. °
Formative Years of National Policy
The articulation of a comprehensive national policy against dis-
crimination had to await the 1960s. This decade, primarily during the
years 1962 to 1968, brought four important national policy develop-
ments. The first such development came in 1962 when President Ken-
nedy promulgated Executive Order 11,063.31 That order prohibited
housing discrimination in a restricted category of housing and specified
means for its enforcement. Secondly, in 1964, Congress enacted Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of that year3 2 which expanded the coverage
of the Executive Order and gave a congressional mandate to bar dis-
pronouncements did not even reach the policy making level as is evi-
dence that these two early federal actions were of any significance in
improving housing opportunity for minorities.33 The impetus of these
pronouncements did not even reach the policy making level as is evi-
denced by action of the FIA, which, until 1966, continued a practice
of red-lining areas where the racial composition was changing so that
no reputable lending institution would grant mortgages on homes in
26. 1959 REPORT, supra note 19, at 469, 538.
27. HousING, supra note 19, at 58-68.
28. Id.
29. 1959 REPORT, supra note 19, at 465.
30. G. GRERa & E. GmR, supra note 11, at 59.
31. See Exec. Order No. 11,063, 3 C.F.R. 652 (1959-63). For a more detailed
analysis of Executive Order 11,063, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
Fair Housing Act of 1968, see text accompanying notes 83-108 infra.
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-1 to -4 (1970).
33. Indicative of the futility of such federal action is the fact that from 1962 to
1967, only 35,000 of the 410,574 FHA-insured houses sold by developers were pur-
chased by minority group members. D. BAUM, TowARD A FREE HOUSING MARKET
28 (1971).. .
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those areas.34 The most significant developments in the evolution of a
national policy on the discrimination in housing did not come until
later.35
Fair housing36 became the law of the land with the passage of the
Fair Housing Act of 1968.1 7  Two months after the enactment of Title
VIII, the Supreme Court in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,3" gave new
life to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which prohibited racial discrimina-
tion in the sale or rental of real or personal property. 9 Thus, the year
1968 saw statements by both Congress and the United States Supreme
Court which helped the national policy against discrimination in hous-
ing truly to come of age.
40
Nature and Extent of Housing Discrimination
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the federal effort against
housing discrimination it is necessary to develop some feeling for the
34. W. Taylor, supra note 21, at 122.
35. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19, 3631 (1970).
36. The Fair Housing Act declares that it "is the policy of the United States to
provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States."
42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970). However, the words "fair housing" are not well-defined.
As a result, the national policy of fair housing has inevitably been accorded widely
varied meanings. Statement by President Richard M. Nixon on Federal Policies Rel-
ative to Equal Housing Opportunity, News Release, June 11, 1971. But see Banks v.
Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175, 1181-82 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
One simple meaning given to the term fair housing is that it is "the achievement
of a condition in which individuals of similar income levels in the same housing mar-
ket area have a like range of housing choices available to them regardless of their
race, color, or national origin." News Release, supra, at 11. Under a broader, more
positive definition, the goal of fair housing would be to increase the accessibility of
minority groups to housing throughout the metropolitan areas. UNITED STATES COMM'N
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT 446 (1970). Finally,
a possible goal for national policy should be to undo the results of officially approved
housing discrimination between the years 1930 and 1962. This goal would include the
achievement of residential integration of the metropolitan areas of the nation, thereby
conjoining the 1949 goal of "a decent home and a suitable living environment for
every American family" with the apparent 1968 goal of removing racial barriers to
home acquisition. Compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-36 (1970) with 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19,
3631 (1970). It should be noted that even the most conservative definition of fair
housing will necessarily involve eradication of discrimination. This thought should be
kept in mind when reading the following section on the extent of discriminatory hous-
ing practices.
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19, 3631 (1970).
38. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
40. The growth and development of state and local fair housing laws virtually
paralleled that of the federal government, but it is not clear whether such laws were a
reflection of the developing national policy or, conversely, whether the national policy
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magnitude of housing discrimination in our society. It is impossible,
however, to measure directly the frequency of discriminatory acts since
such acts are quite varied in form and are often very subtle in nature.
There are ample studies demonstrating the existence of housing dis-
crimination in locales throughout the nation,4' but in order to measure
the extent of housing discrimination in the country, it is necessary to
examine the results of that discrimination-the continuing residential
segregation patterns of neighborhoods, the continuing existence of dual
housing markets (one for whites and another for nonwhites) and the
volume of complaints of housing discrimination. In addition to giving
some indication of the general forms of housing discrimination, the fol-
lowing sections also furnish some insight into the more covert types of
discrimination that have developed in recent years.
Extent of Segregation of Residential Neighborhoods
The level of residential segregation in the United States may be
identified initially by examination of the results of sociological studies
conducted during the past 10 years. In 1967 it was estimated that
some 36 million Americans were living in stable integrated neighbor-
hoods.42 This figure, which represents 20 percent of all American
households, is somewhat deceptive when it is juxtaposed with another
was an outgrowth of state and local developments. New York City led the way in
1954 by passing a city ordinance against discrimination in FHA and VA assisted hous-
ing. G. GRIER & E. GRIER, supra note 11, at 62. By mid-1965, 16 states and a num-
ber of larger cities had followed this lead by passing legislation which barred dis-
crimination in a significant portion of their respective private housing markets. Id.
By mid-1968 the number of states having laws against discrimination in the private
housing market increased to 26 in addition to the District of Columbia and Puerto
Rico. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VoTERs OF THE UNITED STATES, FAcTs & IssUES: A Tohm-
ISE TO KEEP 2 (1968). Furthermore, there were 229 local fair housing ordinances as
of July 15, 1968. Id. at 3. There are presently 32 states and approximately 350
municipalities that have fair housing statutes in one form or another. Interview with
Mrs. Laura Spencer, Deputy Director, Office of Housing Opportunity, Department of
Housing and Urban Development, in Washington, D.C., June 14, 1972. Among these
states and localities there are wide variances as to the coverage and enforcement pro-
cedure provided by the fair housing statutes. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF THE
UNrrED STATFS, supra, at 2. Another important offshoot of the national effort against
housing discrimination is the estimated 1,800 local fair housing committees, mostly
volunteer groups in some 30 states. Hearings on De Facto Segregation and Housing
Discrimination Before the Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity of the
Senate, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 5, at 2677 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Hear-
ings].
41. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEvELoPmENT, A BILIoGRAPHY OF
RESEARCH ON EQUAL OPPoRTUNrY IN HousiNG (1969).
42. N. BRADBURN, S. SuDMAN & G. GoCKEL, SIDE By SIDE: INTEGRATED NEIGH-
BORHOODS IN AmmcA 48 (1971).
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statistic, namely that out of 5,559,000 Negro households in the United
States only 760,000 were located in integrated areas.4" Thus, as of
1967, the vast majority of Negro households were still in segregated
neighborhoods.
As a means of objectively measuring the extent of residential seg-
regation noted demographer Karl Taeuber has devised the Dissimi-
larity Index. An index score of zero indicates total integration-the
presence of Negro households on every city block in proportion to the
total Negro population in the area-while a score of 100 indicates total
residential segregation. 44  Using census data from 1940, 1950 and
1960, Taeuber computed Dissimilarity Indices for the United States of
85 in 1940, 87 in 1950 and 86 in 1960, figures which reflect a continu-
ing concentration of Negroes and whites in segregated areas.4 5 Subse-
quent studies reveal no change in this condition.
46
There are at least three possible explanations for this high degree
of residential segregation in the United States: poverty, preference and
racial discrimination. The income disparity between whites and Ne-
groes contributes to the development of segregated living patterns. In
1969, for example, the median family income of Negroes and other
nonwhites was $6,191.00 as compared to $9,794.00 for white fami-
lies.47 Furthermore, some 39 percent of the minority families had in-
comes of less than $5,000.00, as compared with only 18 percent of the
white families.48 Thus, since nonwhites have lower income levels than
whites, it would follow that many Negro and other minority families
could not afford to live in many parts of the nation's housing areas
and must necessarily dwell in the less desirable ghetto sections.
While differences in income levels give some idea of the extent of
racial discrimination in housing, they by no means present a complete
picture. Karl Taeuber has demonstrated that income disparity accounts
for but a small portion of the residential segregation. Using as control
figures the amount of money spent by Negroes and whites for housing
in 15 cities, Taeuber computed "expected" Dissimilarity Indices which
43. Id. at 58.
44. Taeuber, Residential Segregation, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Aug. 1965, at 12,
14.
45. Id. at 16.
46. See, e.g., Farley & Taeuber, Population Trends and Residential Segregation
Since 1960, 159 SCIENCE 953 (1968).
47. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS
No. 38, THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF NEGROES IN THE U.S., 1970, at 26
(1971), [hereinafter cited as U.S. Census Bureau].
48. Id.
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were one-third to one-tenth the actual measure of residential segrega-
tion." Consequently, the major factor in racial segregation in housing
is something other than economic disparity between the groups.
The proposition that minority group members prefer to live with
"their own kind" has also been advanced as an explanation for resi-
dential segregation. 0 Evidence to the contrary, however, is embodied
in a 1968 study of racial attitudes in fifteen American cities.51 The
study showed that only 13 percent of the Negro respondents wished to
live in all or mostly Negro areas, while 85 percent indicated that the
racial composition of the neighborhood made no difference or that they
preferred areas where the racial percentage was equal.52  Similarly, a
1969 nationwide survey conducted by a national magazine revealed
that 74 percent of the Negro respondents would prefer to live in inte-
grated areas.
53
These studies indicate a marked absence, rather than the existence,
of any preferential pattern on the part of Negroes to live in segregated
residential areas. In any event, neither poverty nor free choice can ade-
quately account for the high degree of racial segregation in our na-
tion's neighborhoods. The available evidence merely buttresses the ob-
vious: racial discrimination-the object of fair housing laws-remains
the principal cause of residential segregation.
Another manifestation of persistent racial discrimination is a de-
velopment over the years of a dual housing market. The 1968 Kerner
Commission found that in a number of American cities, blacks often
pay higher rents than whites for comparable accommodations and that,
consequently, blacks receive less housing value for their money.54 The
49. Taeuber, supra note 44, at 18.
50. It should be noted that this preference, if it does exist, may be caused by the
frequent hostile response of whites towards the first nonwhite arrivals in a white area.
51. Fifteen American Cities, in SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR TE NATIONAL AD-
VISORY COMMISSION ON CIvm DISORDERS (1968).
52. Id. at 15.
53. TRENDS IN Housmo, supra note 20, Aug. 1969, at 2.
54. Tim NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, Report 258
(1968); Mr. Robert C. Embry, Head of the Department of Housing and Community
Development, Baltimore, Maryland, "said a study by his department of families dis-
placed by [an area expressway] showed that black families paid $1,000 to $1,500 more
than the white families for comparable housing." The Baltimore Sun, Mar. 1, 1972,
§ A, at 10, col. 1. A study by the Regional Planning Board of New York revealed
that blacks and Spanish speaking families paid nine to twelve dollars per month more
to live in deficient housing in Nassau and Suffolk Counties than did white families.
TmNDS IN HousiNG, supra note 20, Nov.-Dec., 1969, at 4. This "color tax" exists
because Negroes and other minorities are forced to compete for a supply of housing
which is artificially restricted by discriminatory practices. W. TAYLOR, supra note 21,
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commission also reported that 56 percent of the country's nonwhite
families lived in central cities and that two-thirds of these families lived
in neighborhoods marked by substandard dwellings and general ur-
ban blight.5"
A third index of the nature and extent of discrimination is the
volume of complaints of housing discrimination received by the United
States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and
other similar agencies. 6 In 1969, HUD received 979 complaints of
Fair Housing violations; 7 in 1970, the number increased to 1,025;5"
and in 1971, the department processed 1,570 complaints.59 Typical
of the workload placed on state agencies is a report from the Massachu-
setts Commission Against Discrimination, which reported a gradual
increase in the annual rate of complaints of housing discrimination
from 1963 to 1970 when the state agency alone received almost 300
complaints of discrimination in public and private housing.6 ° Similarly,
at 31. Furthermore the supply of housing available to Negroes in the past has been
substandard and deteriorating, and generally older and poorer in quality than housing
for whites. D. MCENTIRE, RESIDENCE AND RACE 36-66, 119-34 (1960). "Mhe hous-
ing market for blacks in Baltimore was restricted during the past decade and . . . the
1968 Civil Rights Act had resulted in only a slight change in the situation ....
The market in which members of the black community could purchase homes was al-
most entirely restricted to existing houses that had been abandoned by whites." The
Baltimore Sun, supra.
55. THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT 257
(1968). One expert has stated that housing which blacks are constrained by a re-
stricted housing market to occupy "has had relatively little code enforcement or main-
tenance in the years prior to the transition from white to black.
A white buyer has a much wider area to choose from. The larger the market, the
greater the bargaining power." The Baltimore Sun, supra note 54.
56. 1970 Hearings, supra note 40, at 2948. The number of complaints of dis-
crimination is an imperfect measure of housing discrimination in our society, for dis-
crimination in housing has become more covert. Thus, many persons may be unaware
that they are the victims of subtle discrimination practices. Other factors which ren-
der the volume of complaints an imprecise measure of discrimination are that many
persons discriminated against may be reluctant to incur the transaction costs involved in
the complaint resolution process, or that many people may not bother to complain be-
cause of past ineffectiveness of similar complaints. In fact, many people with legiti-
mate complaints may not even be aware of the complaint process. Even with these
problems in mind, it is worthwhile to note that the number of complaints of housing
discrimination to the federal government and to state fair housing agencies has re-
mained steady or has increased.
57. Interview with Mrs. Laura Spencer, supra note 40.
58. HUD, 1970 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 85 (1971).
59. Simmons Marks Fourth Anniversary of Fair Housing Law, HUD News
Release, 1972.
60. MASS. COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION, 1970 ANNUAL REPORT 29
(1971).
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the New York Fair Housing Agency received 707 complaints in 1970
of alleged housing discrimination as opposed to 544 complaints in
1965.1 For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1971, 356 housing
discrimination complaints were filed with the Ohio Civil Rights Com-
mission compared to 198 complaints filed the preceding fiscal year.
62
These figures, while inconclusive 63 in proving any trends in American
housing, certainly demonstrate the continued prevalence of discrimina-
tion even after adoption of the Fair Housing laws of the sixties.
New Dimensions of Housing Discrimination
During the last decade two new developments greatly increased
the complexity of the already thorny problem of discrimination in hous-
ing: greater sophistication in discriminatory practices and migration of
whites to the suburbs. Although fair housing laws have prevented the
more overt manifestations of housing discrimination, 4 one study of real
estate brokers' practices in the suburban areas of the New York metro-
politan area concluded that covert discrimination was widespread. The
study found that the majority of brokers evinced a minimal compliance
with the fair housing laws while endeavoring through "dealing, evasion
and representation" to avoid selling homes to nonwhites in certain
areas, "but not at the risk of trouble."0 5  Certain new and more subtle
forms of discrimination in housing have been devised: some apart-
ments are not rented to persons whose wages are based on an hourly
scale; credit and other criteria are arbitrarily applied; false waiting lists
are maintained; sales and rental agents are not aggressive in following
up on applications from black prospects; and blacks and whites are still
directed by real estate agents toward separate neighborhoods. 0 These
new types of discrimination, while defying detection by unsophisticated
buyers or renters, continue to perpetuate a segregated living pattern and
dual housing markets.
The white migration to the suburbs is a second important factor in
housing segregation. From 1960 to 1969 some 9 million whites left
61. N.Y. STATE DMSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 1970 ANNUAL REPORT 9 (1971).
62. Omo CIVIL RIGmS COMMIssIoN, 12THANNUAL REPORT 6 (1971).
63. The rise in figures could certainly be as attributable to wider knowledge of
the complaint process as to an increase in discrimination.
64. G. SCHERMER, HOUSING GUIDE TO EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 78 (1968).
65. NATIONAL COMMITTEE AGAINST DIScRIMNATION IN HOUSING, JOBS AND HOus-
ING 80-81 (1970).
66. 1970 Hearings, supra note 40, at 2948. Mr. Embry stated to the Baltimore
Sun that in Baltimore "many real estate salesmen and brokers do not deal with the
black part of the community." The Baltimore Sun, supra note 54.
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the inner cities for our nation's suburbs. During the same period, only
170,000 blacks migrated to the suburban areas.6" The 1970 Census
revealed that of the 75.5 million people living in suburban areas, only
3.7 million (5 percent) were Negro. In contrast, some 20 percent of
the 62.6 million people living in central cities were Negro. 8 In the
last decade business and industry have joined the flight to the suburbs
in what has been called the "suburb migration of the metropolitan
economy."69  In the New York metropolitan area from 1959 to 1967,
some 990,000 new jobs were created. Seventy-five percent of these
jobs were located outside of the central city.
There is increasing concern about the isolation of the Negro com-
munity from the jobs which are opening up outside the central cities."°
In many areas, for example, commuting from the central city to sub-
urban jobs may be virtually impossible without substantial expenditures
of both time and money.7'1 Also, employers prefer to hire workers liv-
ing close to work in order to reduce the problem of lateness and ab-
senteeism and to build a labor pool easier to re-employ after lay-offs.
-7 2
Suburban communities of this nation, however, have erected barriers
to the influx of lower income and moderate income families into the
suburbs through the use of restrictive land use controls. These restric-
tions have included requirements that housing be of a minimum dollar
value or a minimum lot size which, of course, is translatable into dollar
value. For example, some 25 percent of the metropolitan area muni-
cipalities with populations over 5,000 persons permit no one-family
occupancy or living unit on less than one-half acre lots.7" Other pro-
hibitions include restrictions upon parks for low-cost mobile homes, or
requirements that developers donate land or actually provide public
improvement.7 1 Such devices tend to force construction costs up,
thereby effectively putting new suburban housing beyond the grasp of
67. 1970 Hearings, supra note 40, at 2667.
68. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 47, at 12.
69. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, CHANGES IN URBAN
AMERICA 2 (1969).
70. 1970 Hearings, supra note 40, at 2768.
71. See Jobs Move to Suburbs; City's Economy Slows, The Baltimore Sun,
September 24, 1972, § A, at 26, col. 4.
72. Hearings on the Proposed Civil Rights Act of 1967 Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 207
(1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 Hearings].
73. TRENDS IN HOUSING, supra note 20, June-July, 1969, at 7.
74. Address by Howard Moskof. Executive Director, President's Committee on
Open Housing, Aug. 1968, in ABA, EDITED PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECTION ON INDI-
VIDUAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILiES, MONOGRAPH No. 2, at 72 (1968).
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low and moderate income families.75 Since nonwhites predominate
in the lower income categories, 76 these land use control devices are as
effective a discriminating device as their more blatant counterparts,
such as restrictive covenants and the like.
There is also a psychological dimension to housing discrimina-
tion. It cannot be denied that discrimination in housing is more than
just a product of racial and ethnic prejudices. One must examine the
basis of these prejudicial attitudes. Certainly, such attitudes can be
explained in part by a variety of rather persistent historical beliefs,
rules, myths, and folklore. 77 Housing discrimination is caused to a de-
gree by these beliefs which include the notion that the entrance of racial
or ethnic minority families will reduce the status of the neighborhood
and its present occupants. The location of a person's home often indi-
cates his social status in the community. He shares this status with
others who occupy the same neighborhood. 7s1 Certain ethnic groups
have traditionally held low status in our society.79 Thus, the arrival of
minority families into a neighborhood may be met by the resistance of
those who believe their social status is threatened.
Such attitudes may also rest on the belief that property values
will inevitably decline with the change in the racial composition of a
neighborhood. This belief has been translated into discriminatory prac-
tice by real estate brokers, mortgage-lending institutions, builders and
governmental agencies.80 Studies have demonstrated, however, that
the arrival of nonwhites into a neighborhood generally has no effect on
property values. In fact, their arrival may increase property values.81
The ultimate solution to housing discrimination may require an effort
at a level at which the present structure of the national policy against
housing discrimination is not directed-indeed, could not be directed.
There are inherent limits to the efficacy of any legislation aimed at re-
moving phantoms as insubstantial as superstition and prejudice.
However, this fact should not deter legislators from attempting to ef-
fectively banish the manifestations of these phantoms wherever they
appear.
8 2
75. W. TAYLOR, supra note 21, at 175.
76. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
77. See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, HoUSINo 2-4 (1961).
78. COMMISSION ON RACE AND HOUSING, WHERE SHALL WE LIVE? 3 (1958).
79. Id. at 18.
80. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, HOUSING 3 (1961).
81. TRENDS IN HOUSING, supra note 20, Aug. 1966, at 8; see L. LAURENTI, PROP-
ERTY VALUES AND RAcE: STUDIS IN SEVEN CITIES 8-27 (1960).
82. See text accompanying notes 252-305 infra.
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Federal Enforcement of Fair Housing Laws-Overview
The preceding section has attempted to present the development
of our national policy against discrimination in housing and the breadth
of the problem confronting that policy. This background is necessary
for a complete understanding of the next section covering the pro-
cedural aspects of the fair housing laws.
The federal plan to enforce the discontinuation of discrimination
in housing permits attacking discrimination under the authority of any
of four laws in an appropriate case, namely, Executive Order 11,063, 8
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,84 Title VIII of the 1968 Fair
Housing Act8" and section 2 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act. 86 A thor-
ough analysis of the available enforcement mechanisms will elucidate
the disparities between policy and practice and will provide a rational
basis for recommendations for change.
Executive Order 11,063
Executive Order 11,063 was issued by President John F. Kennedy
on November 20, 1962.7 The order prohibits discrimination because
of race, creed or national origin in the disposition or use of housing
owned, operated or subsidized by federal, state and local govern-
ments.8s The importance of the order is its articulation of the national
public policy against discrimination in housing rather than its practical
value. A number of factors contribute to the order's ineffectiveness,
among them: (1) The order is "primarily directed at newly con-
structed housing financed wih FHA or VA insured or guaranteed
loans"; 9 (2) the affected housing represents approximately 25 per-
cent of the housing market but less than one percent of the na-
tion's total housing supply;10 and (3) the order does not prohibit dis-
83. Exec. Order No. 11,063, 3 C.F.R. 652 (1959-63).
84. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-1 to -4 (1970).
85. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1970). Section 3631, which provides criminal penal-
ties for acts of intimidation in housing discrimination, is included when reference is
made to the Fair Housing Act of 1968. However, this section was Title IX of the
1968 statute. Therefore, when reference is made to Title VIII it is only to the pro-
visions of section 3601 to 3619.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
87. Exec. Order No. 11,063, 3 C.F.R. 652 (1959-63).
88. Such housing includes any housing that is insured or guaranteed by the fed-
eral government and any that is developed under a state sanctioned urban renewal or
slum clearance program. Id.
89. Comment, The Federal Fair Housing Requirements: Title VIII of the 1968
Civil Rights Act, 1969 DUKE L.J. 733, 748.
90. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT
EFFORT 428 (1970).
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crimination in conventional housing financed by mortgage-lending in-
stitutions whose deposits are insured by the federal government.91
Moreover, the responsibility for the enforcement of the order is placed
upon "all departments and agencies in the executive branch of the
Federal government." '9  This wide dispersal of responsibility and au-
thority makes it difficult to determine who is responsible for failure
of enforcement when enforcement efforts break down.
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not make much of an
improvement on Executive Order 11,063. Indeed, it could be de-
scribed as an even less effective law. Enacted July 2, 1964, Title VI
prohibits discrimination based on race or national origin in programs
and activities receiving federal financial asistance.98 The most severe
limitation of Title VI is that it does not extend "to any program or ac-
tivity under which federal financial assistance is extended by way of a
contract of insurance or guaranty."94  Such activities include the FHA
and VA home mortgage insurance and guaranty programs. The fed-
eral insurance programs for the deposits and accounts of mortgage-
lending institutions are likewise unaffected by Ttitle VI. It did, how-
ever, retrospectively proscribe discrimination in federally assisted hous-
ing programs. Public housing projects receiving annual federal contri-
butions and urban renewal projects not yet in the land disposition stage
were subject to Title VI, even in cases where the contracts for federal
contributions were executed prior to its enactment.9 5
Taken together, Executive Order 11,063 and Title VI comprised
a broad prohibition of discrimination in federal housing programs.
Under both measures federal departments and agencies were empow-
ered to issue rules, regulations and orders to effectuate the non-dis-
criminatory policies in their programs and activities. 96 However, both
measures failed to reach the massive private housing market and there-
fore failed to resolve effectively the central problems facing minorities
in their efforts to obtain better housing.
91. Id.
92. Exec. Order No. 11,063, § 101, 3 C.F.R. 652, 653 (1959-63).
93. 42 U.S.C. 9H 2000d to -d4 (1970).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4 (1970).
95. 29 Fed. Reg. 16280 (1964); U.S. COMMISSION ON CVIL RIrHTS, FFDERAL
CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCBMENT EFFORT 431 (1970).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1970); Exec. Order No. 11,063, § 203, 3 C.F.R. 652,
654 (1959-63). For a list of the Federal Housing and Urban Development pro-
grams currently covered by Title VI, see 24 C.F.R. 24 (1972).
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Title Vm of the 1968 Civil Rights Act
In contrast to these ineffective measures, the Fair Housing Act
of 196897 is a far more pervasive measure-and this time a measure
with some punch. Title VIII prohibits discrimination on account of
race, color, religion or national origin on a much wider range than did
either of its predecessors. The prohibitions of Title VIII are designed
to reach private real estate transactions as well as those involving the
federal government. It proscribes discrimination in the sale or rental
of housing, 8 in the advertising of such housing,99 in the activities of a
real estate agent and broker in connection with sale or rental of such
housing,10 the financing of housing,10 and the operation of multiple-
listing services and real estate brokers organizations.'1 2 Title VIII also
makes it unlawful to practice "block-busting."'0 3  The only exemp-
tions to Title VIII prohibitions are: (1) single family houses sold or
rented without the assistance of real estate brokers, agents or sales-
men; 04 (2) owner-occupied dwellings containing no more than "four
families living independently of each other";0  (3) noncommercial
housing operated by religious groups;10 6 and (4) "lodgings" operated
by private clubs.'
The United States Civil Rights Commission estimates that Title
VIII now covers approximately 80 percent of the nation's 70 million
97. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19, 3631 (1970).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1970). At first glance Title VIII seems to make it
unlawful to refuse to sell or rent to a person because of race, color, religion, or na-
tional origin only after the making of a bona fide offer. A careful reading of section
3604(a), however, shows that the law is violated by (1) a refusal to negotiate for a
sale or rental, (2) any action which makes unavailable or denies a dwelling or
(3) refusal to sell or rent after makng a bona fide offer.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1970). Holmgren v. Little Village Community
Reporter, 342 F. Supp. 512 (N.D. Il. 1971); United States v. Hunter, 324 F. Supp. 529
(D. Md. 1971).
100. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a), (d) (1970). See United States v. Gilman, 341 F.
Supp. 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1970).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 3606 (1970).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (1970). See United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty,
Inc., 313 F. Supp. 870 (N.D. Ga. 1970); United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305
(D. Md. 1969).
104. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3603(b), (c) (1970). This exemption applies only if the
owner meets the statutory criteria, which basically require that he not be "in the busi-
ness" of selling or renting dwellings. Id.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (1970).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 3607 (1970). Such organizations may give preference to their
members, but only if they do not discriminate on the basis of race or national origin
in membership. Id.
107. Id.
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housing units.108 Although Title VIII constitutes a landmark of great
importance in the evolution of the national policy toward discrimina-
tion in housing, an entirely effective national policy requires more than
statutory proscriptions against certain conduct. That additional re-
quirement is an effective enforcement system. While the procedural
mechanics of Title VIII are a big step forward in this area, they never-
theless fall short of optimal implementation of our stated objective.
Section 1982
Equal in importance to Title VIII of the 1968 Act is section 1982
enacted as section two of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.109 This statute,
as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co.,110 completely bars racial discrimination in the housing
industry."' Section 1982 states quite simply that:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every
State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to in-
herit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal prop-
erty.112
In Jones the Court held that section 1982 was a valid exercise of
congressional power under the Thirteenth Amendment to remove the
"relics [or] badges of slavery.""' 8  The case left open the question
whether section 1982 is applicable to incidents of racial discrimination
involving nonwhite minority group members other than Negroes.
However, from the broad language in both section 1982 and Jones,
there seems little doubt that the Court will apply Jones to non-Negro
minorities as well." 4
108. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT
EFFORT 434 (1970).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
110. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
111. Smedley, A Comparative Analysis of Title VIII and Section 1982, 22 VAnD.
L. REv. 459, 467 (1969). Professor Smedley observes that the Jones decision appears
to make the 1866 statute applicable to 100 percent of the total housing supply, without
delay and without exemptions favoring single-family house owners. The act has been
interpreted to bar discrimination against whites because of their black guests, Walker
v. Pointer, 304 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Texas 1969). Thus indirect victims may have
standing to bring claims under the act.
112. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970). Federal courts have held that section 1982 pro-
hibits not only racially-motivated refusals to sell or lease property, but also discrimina-
tory terms or conditions used in the sale of property. Contract Buyers League v. F. &
F. Investment, 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ill., E.D. 1969).
113. 392 U.S. at 441, 443.
114. An earlier case buttresses this proposition. In Oyama v. California, 332
U.S. 633 (1948), the Supreme Court overturned California's Alien Land Law on the
ground that the State action which restricted the right of Japanese-American citizens
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Enforcement Machinery
Until 1968 federal law prohibiting discrimination in housing had
two central weaknesses: the limited scope of the coverage of the laws
and an ineffectual plan of enforcement. The reach of the pre-1968
laws was so limited that discrimination in most of the nation's housing
resources did not come under the prohibition of the law. Even if those
laws had contained more effective methods of enforcement, because of
their limited scope housing discrimination against minorities would most
likely have continued on a broad scale. Therefore, in 1968, there
were two important tasks to be accomplished: the proscription of dis-
crimination in the bulk of the housing market and the development of
effective machinery for the enforcement of those sanctions. The dis-
cussion in the previous section outlining proscribed activities reveals
that the first of these tasks has largely been met. However, the value of
those proscriptions can only be measured by the effectiveness of the
plan for their enforcement. For ease of analysis, the available enforce-
ment machinery can be categorized as either private or public. A pri-
vate remedy is available to individuals through either judicial or admin-
istrative processes; public remedies can be obtained through HUD or
the Justice Department in the form of "pattern and practice" suits, com-
pliance reviews, and the inducement of private affirmative action by
operators in the housing market. These enforcement devices will be
critically reviewed in the remainder of this section.
The victim of discrimination is faced with a confusing and con-
flicting array of problems in selecting the forum in which to seek re-
dress. Initially, he must decide whether to seek a federal or a state
to own and convey land was contrary to section 1982 of the 1866 Act, and a denial of
"equal protection under the law." Oyama might be used to argue that, superimposing
the Oyama decision on Jones, non-Negro minorities would receive similar protection
under section 1982.
The extremely broad scope of section 1982 has been limited somewhat by a
Fourth Circuit decision, Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association, 451 F.2d
1211 (4th Cir. 1971). The Tillman court held that section 1982's prohibition of
racial discrimination in the sale or rental of both real and personal property was
subject to the "private club exemption" in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a(e) (1970). The decision was reversed on appeal, but the Supreme Court
found it unnecessary to deal with the private club distinction since it found the as-
sociation was not truly a private club. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n,
41 U.S.L.W. 4311, 4314 (Feb. 27, 1973). In any event, Jones noted that section 1982
is subject to an additional enforcement restriction in that it may be enforced only by
the institution of private litigation in a federal district court. 392 U.S. at 413-14.




remedy. In making this seemingly simple decision, a number of some-
what complex issues arise: if the federal remedy is elected, does the
victim foreclose his state remedy; if he pursues a state remedy first, is
he later barred from seeking redress under federal law; if he elects a ju-
dicial remedy under federal law, is he barred from later seeking relief
from a federal administrative agency; and will he be excluded from
the courts if he first seeks an administrative relief? These questions
will be confronted in the order presented, leaving until the end a dis-
cussion of the intricacies of administrative remedies and their interac-
tion with judicial remedies.
Private Judicial Remedies
1982 Actions
One who is the subject of discriminatory practices may seek re-
dress under federal law through private litigation. As a practical mat-
ter, a private litigant would neither refer to nor rely upon either Execu-
tive Order 11,063 or Title VI, because of the more effective remedies
available under the 1866 Act (section 1982) and Title VIII of the
1968 Civil Rights Act. He would probably place primary reliance on
section 1982 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act as construed in Jones.115
The Jones Court held that an "effective equitable remedy" could be
fashioned to relieve and redress section 1982 infractions." 6 Following
the Court's broad mandate, lower federal courts have issued injunc-
tions' 7 and awarded compensatory damages to plaintiffs in section
1982 actions."18 Furthermore, punitive damages may be awarded if
the actions of the discriminating party are found to have been in wil-
ful disregard of the rights of the complainant." 9
115. Jones seems to be a preferable ground upon which to rest private litigation in
that it has a longer statute of limitations and under it the court has greater flexibility
in fashioning a remedy. Compare text accompanying note 127 infra with text accom-
panying notes 275-84 infra. Further, the court seems under Jones to have greater
overall flexibility. See, e.g., McLaurin v. Brusturis, 320 F. Supp. 190 (E.D. Wis.
1970). This statute, however, has been interpreted by the Supreme Court only in
cases where Negro plaintiffs were involved. See text accompanying notes 113-14 supra.
116. 392 U.S. at 414 n.13.
117. See Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 429 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1970); Rogers
v. Loether, 312 F. Supp. 1008 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
118. Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1970). See
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 414 n.14 (1968). For the rationale of
the remedies see Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 238-40 (1969);
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39
(1916).
119. Lee v. Southern Home Sites, 429 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1970).
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Attorneys Fees in 1982 Actions
Of particular importance is the award of attorneys fees to victori-
ous plaintiffs in section 1982 actions. One of the factors determining
the relative effectiveness of litigation as a means of enforcing civil
rights laws is the practical availability of legal counsel to aggrieved
parties. Unfortunately, the high costs of litigation may discourage po-
tential plaintiffs from attempting to vindicate federally protected rights
because of the high risks created by the difficulties of proof. In the
absence of a recovery of attorneys fees for a victorious plaintiff, a judi-
cial remedy may, in many cases, be virtually unavailable.
The Supreme Court has not been unmindful of this very significant
practical consideration when it has approached problems dealing with
section 1982. Nor has it found itself lacking in ingenuity while de-
veloping a body of case law that would carry the spirit as well as the
letter of the congressional mandate. Two judicial devices, the con-
cept of a "private attorney general" and the more traditional award of
attorneys fees in appropriate cases, have found their way into section
1982 litigation.
In 1968, the Court in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises'20 held
that reasonable attorneys fees should be awarded to successful plaintiffs
in actions involving public accommodations under Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Attorneys fees, the Court said, should be
awarded as a matter of course unless special circumstances would ren-
der such an award unjust.' 2' From Newman evolved the concept of
120. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
121. Id. at 402. Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act expressly provides that
"the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's
fee as part of the costs" of the suit. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970). Thus the
Court's ruling in Newman was in fact restricted to a determination of what criteria
should govern whether an award of attorneys' fees is appropriate under such a provi-
sion. In reaching its decision the Court reasoned as follows: "When the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 was passed it was evident that enforcement would prove difficult
and that the Nation would have to rely in part upon private litigation as a means of
securing broad compliance with the law. A Title II suit is thus private in form only.
When a plaintiff brings an action under that Title he cannot recover damages. If
he obtains an injunction he does so not for himself alone but also as a "private attorney
general," vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority. If
successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attorney's fees, few ag-
grieved parties would be in a position to advance the public interest by invoking the
injunctive powers of the federal courts. Congress therefore enacted the provision for
counsel fees-not simply to penalize litigants who deliberately advance arguments
they know to be untenable but, more broadly, to encourage individuals injured by ra-
cial discrimination to seek judicial relief under Title II." 390 U.S. at 401-02. Deci-
sions subsequent to Newman have indicated that at least some federal courts are willing
to allow attorneys' fees upon a similar rationale even where no express statutory au-
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subsidizing people who might be designated "private attorneys gen-
eral" in litigation to enforce or vindicate federal civil rights. The
courts have reasoned that the violation of civil rights statutes are a vio-
lation of an important public policy that may involve only negligible
monetary damage in comparison to the cost of vindication. Therefore
a successful plaintiff should be relieved of the financial burden of en-
forcing these rights. 2 ' In essence, the complainant has donned the
mantle of the sovereign when enforcing public policy.
In 1972 the Newman reasoning was followed by the First Circuit
Court of Appeals in Knight v. Anciello,2 3 where an award of attor-
neys fees was allowed in a section 1982 action. The court noted that
the law in this area was not fully developed and advised district courts
to make findings of facts as to the desirability of counsel fees in all
civil rights cases.124  One year earlier Judge Wisdom, speaking for
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Lee v. Southern Homes Sites,
was more emphatic when he stated that "attorney's fees are part of
the effective remedy a court should fashion to carry out the congres-
sional policy embodied in section 1982." '' 5 The United States Su-
preme Court buttressed Judge Wisdom's analysis when, in holding that
standing under Title VIII includes more than direct victims, it noted
that plaintiffs in housing discrimination cases are acting as "private
attorneys general" in vindicating an important public policy to which
Congress has given the highest priority.12 6 Section 1982 plaintiffs,
therefore, would seem to be entitled to attorneys fees as a matter of
course.
One final point regarding section 1982 should be made before dis-
cussing the judicial remedies available under Title VIII. Section 1982
provides no limitations period for the institution of civil actions. Con-
sequently, courts have applied the appropriate state statutes of limita-
tion which govern similar relief in state courts.
127
thorization exists. E.g., Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972); Lee v.
Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971); NAACP v. Allen, 340
F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972). Contra Bradley v. School Board, Civ. No. 71-1774
(4th Cir. November 29, 1972). In Bradley the court expressly declined to award fees
upon the "private attorney general" theory because no express allowance for fee shift-
ig was included in the relevant statute.
122. Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972).
123. 453 F.2d 852 (Ist Cir. 1972).
124. 453 F.2d at 853 n.1.
125. 444 F.2d 143, 144 (5th Cir. 1971).
126. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 93 S. Ct. 364 (1972).




When pursuing a remedy through private litigation, the plaintiff
usually will rely upon section 3612 of the 1968 Fair Housing Act in
addition to section 1982. Section 3612 provides for the enforcement
of Title VIII rights by the institution of private civil actions without
first seeking administrative relief. 128  Standing to sue under section
3612 may not be limited to direct victims of discriminatory housing
practices proscribed by Title VIII. Another part of Title VIII con-
tained a definition of "persons aggrieved" under the act, and this term
of art has recently been interpreted to include the tenants of a resi-
dential complex which allegedly screened applicants in an illegal man-
ner. 129  Because section 3612 has no independent definition of the
class of persons it protects, and because the statute is an integrated
whole, 10 section 3612 plaintiffs should acquire the same broad defini-
tion.
Actions under section 3612 may be filed without regard to the
amount in controversy. 13' Actions under section 3612 must be filed
with the appropriate federal, state or local court within 180 days after
the alleged discriminatory act or practice occurred. 132  However, the
limitations statute may be tolled by filing an action under the adminis-
trative complaint procedure with the Equal Opportunity Section of
IIJD.133
The type of relief available for victims of discrimination under
3612 suits includes all forms of injunctions, compensatory and punitive
($1,000 limit) damages and costs. 34  In addition, the statute pro-
vides for the appointment of counsel and waiver of fees, costs, and se-
128. 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1970). This section is particularly attractive since it
allows immediate access to the courts without prior recourse to HUD's administrative
processes which is required under section 3610. The right of an aggrieved party to
direct access to the federal district courts under 3612 now seems to be firmly estab-
lished. Crim v. Glover, 338 F. Supp. 823 (S.D. Ohio 1972). The court stated,
"[olur view is in accord with the weight of authority. A clear majority of cases which
have considered this question have either squarely held or broadly implied that the
remedies of [sections 3610 and 3612] exist in the alternative." Id. at 825.
129. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 93 S. Ct. 364 (1972). The case
construed "persons aggrieved," as defined in section 3610 (the administrative remedies
provision) to include tenants in a residential community which allegedly practiced ille-
gal discriminatory practices.
130. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610(f), 3612(a) (1970).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a) (1970).
132. Id.
133. Id. § 3610(d).
134. Id. § 3612(c) (1970). See Brown v. Lo Duca, 307 F. Supp. 102 (E.D.
Wis. 1969).
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curity "upon application of the plaintiff and in such circumstances as
the Court may deem just."'35  Reasonable attorneys fees may be
awarded in appropriate actions; however, such awards may not be
made where, in the opinion of the court, the plaintiff is financially able
to assume the burden. 136  Thus, section 3612 suits are at a disadvan-
tage to suits brought under section 1982 in this respect because the
limitation of plaintiff's ability to pay has not yet been held to be a
consideration in awarding fees for an action under section 1982. An
analysis of section 3612(c), which bars attorneys fees where the plain-
tiff is able to pay, requires the court in each 3612 suit to make a de-
termination of (1) the plaintiff's financial ability to assume any fees,
and (2) the reasonable amount of fees in the case. If the amount of
the fees outweighs the plaintiff's ability to pay, he is entitled to attor-
neys fees.' 37
Section 3610
A third statute, section 3610 of Title VfII, also provides a judicial
remedy for a complainant.3 " Standing to bring a claim under this sec-
tion is restricted to "persons aggrieved." Under the act an aggrieved
person is one "who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory
housing practice or who believes he will be irrevocably injured by a
135. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(b) (1970).
136. Id. 3612(c) (1970). See Williamson v. Hampton Management Co., 339 F.
Supp. 1146, 1149 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
137. Given the explicit language of section 3612(c), denying fees where the
plaintiff is able to pay, it would be impossible for the courts to apply the doctrine of
private attorneys general to section 3612 civil actions, unless the court had previously
determined that the plaintiff is unable to pay such fees. In the latter case it would be
difficult to distinguish the role of such section 3612 plaintiffs from the role of section
1982 or 3610 plaintiffs, both of whom also are recognized as "private attorneys general."
The role played by private litigants under sections 1982, 3612, or 3610 is in furtherance
of well-established national public policy "that Congress considered to be of the high-
est priority." Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 93 S. Ct. 364, 367 (1972).
It would seem that an aggrieved party could bring his action under any one of the
three provisions; however, sections 3612 and 3610 are alternative remedies. Brown v.
Lo Duco, 387 F. Supp. 102, 103 (E.D. Wis. 1969), and section 3612 usually results in
a shorter statute of limitations. See text accompanying notes 275-84 infra. Thus a
plaintiff who seeks conciliation through administrative processes before litigation may
be forced to bring his claim under section 1982 and section 3610. Given these options,
rarely would a plaintiff need to expose himself to the cost of attorney fees by relying
solely upon section 3612.
138. 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1970). However, it must be remembered that section
3610 is primarily an administrative remedy provision. See text accompanying notes
149-50 infra. Section 3610(b) provides that the initial complaint must be filed
within 180 days of the discriminatory event and that subsequent civil actions must be
initiated within thirty days after notice of HUD's inability to resolve the matter.
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discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur. . . ."' In a
recent decision, Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,140 the
Court said that these broad and inclusive words show "a congressional
intention to define standing as broadly as is permitted by Article I of
the Constitution."' 14 1  In the case, the Court allowed standing to a pair
of tenants who challenged the allegedly discriminatory activity.
The judicial aspects of section 3610 do not arise unless and until
an administrative complaint is filed with HUD.141 If HUD dismisses
the complaint or is unable to secure voluntary compliance, 143 a civil
action under 3610(d) may be started. However, the complainant has
only thirty days from HUD's notice of action to file his action in a
court of law before he loses his rights under section 3610.144
139. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1970).
140. 93 S. Ct. 364 (1972).
141. Id. at 367.
142. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(d) (1970).
143. If HUD judges that the complainant's grievance has no merit, it can dismiss
the complaint. However, if it determines to resolve it, this decision is usually followed
by an effort to resolve the complaint by "conference, conciliation and persuasion."
42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1970). HUD's efforts are not always successful. Where the
HUD dismisses the complaint or is unable to resolve it, the complainant then must
decide whether to commence a law suit. The problem of initiating a law suit is
avoided if HUD resolves the complaint, since HUD obtains the consent of the com-
plainant to any settlement agreement. If the complainant elects to sue, he may only
sue the respondents named in his complaint to HUD. James v. Haler, 320 F. Supp.
397, 399 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(d) (1970). The section provides the alternative time of
thirty days following reference back to the secretary from a state agency where he had
previously deferred to the state because of its substantially equivalent laws. Id. See
also Brown v. Ballas, 331 F. Supp. 1033, 1035 (N.D. Tex. 1971); 24 C.F.R. § 105.16
(a) (1972). Thirty days after filing the complaint with HUD the plaintiff may re-
quest notice from the secretary that HUD is unable or unwilling to resolve the com-
plaint. Fair Housing Regulations, 24 C.F.R. § 105.16(b) (1972). Section 105.16 also
provides that the complainant should be advised by certified mail of his right to re-
quest such notice of the expiration of the period of thirty days. The 30 days allotted
plaintiff to bring suit under § 3610(d) begins from the time the required notice is
given. . . . The Plaintiff will not be penalized because the agency conducting the ad-
ministrative inquiry has failed to terminate its inquiry within the statutory limits or
because it has failed to notify the plaintiff of their action. Brown v. Ballas, 331 F.
Supp. 1033, 1036 (N.D. Tex. 1971). If state remedies provide "substantially equiva-
lent remedies," HUD must refer the complaint to the applicable state agency. The
state agency then has thirty days to respond. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(c) (1970). In such a
case, the plaintiff's thirty day limitations period to commence legal action begins
thirty days after the expiration of this thirty days reference period. Id. § 3610(d).
Section 3610(d) somewhat limits the access of complainants to federal court if they
wish to file suit under that section. The section provides that the complainant must
sue in state courts if the state or local fair housing law provides "substantially equiva-
lent" rights and remedies. The determination of whether the state or local laws pro-
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The type of relief available under section 3610(d) is limited to
injunctions or to "such affirmative actions as may be appropriate."
Such action has been held not to include an award of damages to the
successful plaintiff.145  There is no provision in section 3610(d) simi-
lar to that in section 3612 for the appointment of counsel for indigent
plaintiffs or for an award of reasonable attorneys fees to a victorious
plaintiff. However, the Court held in Trafficante that:
the main generating force in [Title VIII enforcement] must be
private suits in which, the Solicitor General says, the complainants
act not only on their own behalf but also "as private attorney gen-
eral in vindicating a policy that Congress considered to be of the
highest priority." The role of "private attorneys general" is not
uncommon in modem legislative programs. . . . It serves an
important role in this part of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 in pro-
tecting. . . those against whom a discrimination is directed .... 146
Under Trafficante, section 3610 plaintiffs, like section 1982 plaintiffs,
may enjoy the status of private attorneys general and thus may be en-
titled to an award of reasonable attorney fees in appropriate circum-
stances. Moreover, a plaintiff who proceeds under section 1982 is en-
titled to attorney fees. Thus, only in the rare circumstance where a
plaintiff proceeds under section 3612 alone, assuming its restrictions
are not extended to sections 1982 and 3610 when brought jointly,
would attorney fees be limited only to plaintiffs who are unable to pay
the cost of retaining legal counsel.1 47
vide "substantially equivalent" judicial remedies or relief is apparently to be made by
the federal district courts. See, e.g., McLaurin v. Brusturis, 320 F. Supp. 190 (E.D.
Wis. 1970); Colon v. Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 104 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
145. Brown v. Ballas, 331 F. Supp. 1033, 1036 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
146. 93 S. CL at 367-68.
147. Persons injured by discrimination who are unable to afford counsel may be
vindicated by a class action. Class actions have been liberally permitted by the courts.
But see Crim v. Glover, 338 F. Supp. 823 (S.D. Ohio 1972). In that case the court
held: "We do not believe this suit is appropriately in class action under Rule 23(a),
Fed. R. Civ. P. In a similar suit under Title VIII our Circuit Court held that:
'clearly one family is not a class .... [Aln action is not maintainable as a class ac-
tion merely because it is designated as such in the pleadings .... The plaintiff has
the positive burden of showing that the circumstances surrounding the case justify a de-
termination by the district court, on a motion to dismiss or otherwise, that the number
is so large that it would be impracticable to join all the parties. That was not done in
this case.' Cash v. Swifton Land Corporation, 434 F.2d 569, 571 (6th Cir. 1970).
It was not done in the case at bar either." 338 F. Supp. at 826. Such actions have
been permitted under both Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 and section 1982
of the 1866 Act. In a wide range of cases based upon the two statutes, plaintiffs have
pressed claims for themselves and for others similarly situated. Lee v. Southern Home
Sites Corp., 429 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1970) (class action in lot sale discrimination case
permitted); Boyd v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 790 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (class action
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Administrative Complaint Processing
In addition to pursuing litigation remedies under sections 3612 or
1982, a complainant is permitted, with the exception of action taken
pursuant to section 3610, to pursue simultaneously administrative set-
tlement through the Equal Opportunity Section of HUD. Actions
filed under section 3610 provide an exception to this general rule since
the section contains its own procedure for seeking judicial review after
exhaustion of its administrative remedies. Accordingly, its provisions
and those of section 3612 of the same act have been held to be alterna-
tive remedies under Title VIII.14 s Because the administrative remedies
of section 3610 provide such an important part of the overall scheme,
they will be considered first.
Administrative Processing Under Title V111
The process involved in instituting a complaint and pursuing it
to possible conciliation has proven to be a rather cumbersome one.
Standing to initiate a complaint is extended to a wide range of potential
plaintiffs. As mentioned earlier,'49 any "person aggrieved" may lodge
a complaint with HUD pursuant to section 3610. Such persons must
file their complaint within 180 days after the alleged discriminatory
practice occurred. 50
permitted in attack on Attorney General consent agreement with offending landlord
under Title VIII); Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, 344 F. Supp. 737
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (permitted class action under Title VI, Title VIII and § 1981); James
v. Hafler, 320 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (class action permitted in apartment
rental discrimination case); Contract Buyers League v. F. & F. Investment, 300 F.
Supp. 210 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (class action in home sale discrimination in terms and
price permitted). Cf. Jenkins v. United States Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir.
1968); Norwalk Core v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968);
Heyward v. Public Housing Administration, 238 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1956), and Detroit
Housing Comm'n v. Lewis, 226 F.2d 180 (6th Cir. 1955). Class actions should be
brought as a matter of course in fair housing litigation, since the prosecution of private
class actions permits the court to fashion a broader remedy, particularly if it orders
affirmative action as a form of relief. The court is empowered to grant affirmative
action in Title VIII suits. Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143(5th Cir.
1971). Therefore, if the plaintiff has brought a class action, the court is able to
fashion relief sufficiently broad to take care of the entire class. In Lee the court
ordered the respondent to take affirmative action to correct the effects of its discrimi-
nation with respect to the entire class of which the plaintiff is a member. This result
has two important advantages. First, it furthers the national policy more significantly
and second, it obviates the need for other parties injured by the respondent to incur
the transaction costs of litigating their claim, thus saving the courts and, indeed, the
legal system the time and costs of settling the claim.
148. Brown v. Lo Duca, 307 F. Supp. 102, 103 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
149. See text accompanying notes 138-41 supra.
150. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a), (b) (1970).
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The secretary of HUD is charged with the responsibility of (1)
investigating the complaint, (2) determining whether to resolve the
complaint, and (3) initiation of efforts "to eliminate or correct the al-
leged discriminatory housing practice by informal methods of confer-
ence, conciliation and persuasion."'' 51 The statute also provides that,
absent substantially equivalent state law, the secretary must investigate
the complaint within thirty days after it is received by the department.
HUD must then give notice to the complainant as to whether the de-
partment intends to resolve the complaint.152
If state or local fair housing laws provide "substantially equiva-
lent" rights and remedies as those provided under Title VIII, HUD
must refer the complaint to the appropriate state or local agency. 53
In those states where HUD has determined that state law is "substan-
tially equivalent" to Title VIII, the complaint is routinely referred to
those state agencies. If within thirty days after the complaint has been
forwarded the state or local agency has not commenced proceedings
or carried them forward with reasonable promptness, HUD may recall
the complaint for further internal processing. 54 As long as state pro-
ceedings are going forward, however, the handling of complaints is left
to the state agencies.
Regional offices of HUD receive and "supervise" the processing
of complaints. The investigatory powers of a regional administrator
are relatively broad. 155 For example, if his interview of the com-
plainant and the alleged discriminator fails to produce satsifactory in-
formation, he is empowered under section 3611 to issue subpoenas to
compel the production of records or to compel an individual to tes-
tify.'56 If his investigation reveals evidence which, "on the balance,"
indicates that there has been a discriminatory housing practice, then
he is instructed to "affirmatively determine to attempt to resolve the
151. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(c) (1970).
152. Id.
153. Id. HUD now tentatively recognizes twenty-four states as having "substan-
tially equivalent" rights and remedies. For a list, see HUD, TrrLE VIII FmLD OPERA-
TiONS HNDBooK, Departmental Memorandum of HUD, No. EO 8020.1, appen. 10, at
3 (March 1971) [hereinafter cited as TrILE VIII HANDBOOK]. In December, 1971
HUD proposed regulations which would create procedures for the determination of
"substantially equivalent" state and local fair housing laws. 36 Fed. Reg. 23631
(1971).
154. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(c) (1970).
155. See generally TrILE VIII HANDBooK, supra note 153. The investigation
of a complaint begins after a preliminary determination that the complaint is within
the jurisdiction of HUD under Title VIII. Id. at 2.
156. 42U.S.C. § 3611(a) (1970).
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complaint."' 57  If he merely decides to recall a referred complaint for
processing or initiates processing without referral, his powers are the
same.
158
After the determination to resolve the complaint has been made,
the conciliation process begins. The objectives of this process are to
secure relief and redress for the complainant and other similarly situated
parties and to eliminate or correct the discriminatory patterns or prac-
tices of the respondent. In appropriate cases the department may also
seek "institutional relief" or "affirmative action."'159 The type of relief
available to the complaintant is not prescribed by Title VIII. Thus re-
lief can be tailored to the particular cases.
The department's handbook suggests three types of individual re-
lief that might result from a successful conciliation: (1) access to the
housing in question or its equivalent; (2) compensatory damages; or
(3) damages for embarrassment, humiliation and insult, if the acts
of the respondent are "glaringly discriminatory."' 60 In one such con-
ciliation effort, the complainant received $1,970.00 for loss of resi-
dence, embarrassment and inconvenience. In another, the complainant
received access to the housing and six months free rent.' 6'
An additional objective of the conciliation process is to obtain an
agreement for "institutional relief" which seeks to modify past prac-
tices of the respondent, to cure the effects of past discrimination, and
to prevent future discrimination. HUD considers that such relief could
include an affirmative action program for the respondent, which in
turn may encompass promises to advertise in minority communities, to
notify fair housing groups of vacancies, to post rental policies and to
file written reports after ninety days with HUD to demonstrate com-
pliance with the program.'
16 2
The weakness inherent in the administrative process is HUD's in-
ability to assure the complainant that he will receive the housing which
he was denied, however flagrant the discriminatory act. On the other
hand, the administrative process has two important advantages. First,
HUD has more flexibility than the courts to fashion relief for the com-
plainant and particularly for furtherance of national policy through use
157. TIrLE VIII HANDBOOK, supra note 153, at 41.
158. Id. at 35-36, 30.4.
159. Id. at 43.
160. Id. at 53.
161. A. Simmons, Minority Americans, 1971 JOURNAL OF HOUSING 329.
162. TrrLE VIII HANDBOOK, supra note 153, at 53.
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of affirmative action programs. Second, there is no cost to the com-
plainant.
Administrative Processing Under Title VI
Should the complainant feel that he has suffered harm from acts
proscribed by Title VI of the 1964 act, he may file his complaint
with the Assistant Secretary of Equal Opportunity of HUD. That de-
partment has responsibility for the processing of Title VI complaints.
HUD processes Title VI complaints in approximately the same manner
as it processes complaints of violations of Title VIII.' 63 Complaints
regarding violations of Title VI may be filed by any person (or any
specific class of persons) who believes himself to have been subjected
to discrimination in a federal housing or federally sponsored housing
program. These complaints must be filed not more than ninety days
after the alleged discriminatory actions occurred.164
HUD regional offices are instructed to initiate investigations upon
receipt of a complaint. These investigations are to be limited to the
allegations contained in the complaint. 1 5 Title VI complaints may re-
sult in: (1) informal efforts to achieve the voluntary compliance of
the discriminating party, or (2) termination of, refusal to continue, or
refusal to grant federal financial assistance. 66  There is no special pro-
vision for relief for the individual complainant under Title VI. How-
ever, corrective actions under Title VI may result in relief for the ag-
grieved individual or a specified class of aggrieved persons.
67
Administrative Processing Under Executive Order 11,063
Individual complaints concerning violations of the Executive Or-
der 11,063 can also be filed with HUD. The procedure for handling
163. Compare HUD Regulations, 36 Fed. Reg. 8821 (1971) (delegating authority
to Assistant Secretary for Equal Opportunity for Title VI enforcement) with HUD
Regulations, 34 Fed. Reg. 946 (1969) (delegating Title VIII responsibilities to As-
sistant Secretary for Equal Opportunity).
164. 24 C.F.R. § 1.7(b) (1972).
165. HUD, TrIE VI EQUAL OPPORTuNITY HANDBOOK 8 (1971).
166. 24 C.F.R. §§ 1.8 to 1.12, 2.1 to 2.131 (1972). The law also contains a provi-
sion that such departments enforcing this title may effect compliance by "any other
means authorized by law." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1970). This was a vague and
almost meaningless appendage at the time of enactment in light of the virtual non-
existence of other law on the subject in 1964. Congress' failure to spell out at that
time what other means of enforcement it apprehended itself to authorize was a serious
policy failure. However, other means now exist which those other departments en-
forcing the title may employ in their enforcement efforts.
167. Those federal agencies to which Title VI is applicable are authorized "to
effectuate the provisions of section 2000d of this title... by issuing rules, regulations,
such complaints is provided by the order. After investigation, which
may include public or private hearings,""8 HUD has the authority to
seek voluntary compliance with the order through "informal means, in-
cluding conference, conciliation and persuasion."169 If voluntary per-
suasion is not successful, HUD may then invoke the application of
other sanctions to parties who are violating the order. Such sanctions
include: (1) the cancellation or termination of existing federal aid,
agreements or contracts; 7 0 (2) the suspension of a party's eligibility
for federal aid or assistance;' 71 (3) the refusal to approve a lending in-
stitution as a beneficiary under federal housing programs or the revo-
cation of such approval; 172 or (4) the institution of a criminal or civil
action by the Justice Department upon a referral of an "appropriate"
case from another executive department or agency.
173
Federal agencies and departments other than HUD also have
power under Executive Order 11,0631 74 and Title V1 75 to issue
regulations to effectuate the purposes of the fair housing laws. The
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 76 for example, has issued regula-
tions specifically applying the law to its member institutions. The
board's regulations provide that individual complaints should be filed
with HUD for processing. 77  Other agencies may establish similar
complaint procedures or may provide for processing of complaints by
its own staff.
Choosing Alternative Remedies
HUD's Title VIII Handbook instructs its investigators on the im-
or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the
objectives of the statute ...... 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1970).
168. Exec. Order No. 11,063, § 301, 3 C.F.R. 654 (1959-63).
169. Id. at § 302.
170. Id. at § 302(a).
171. Id. at § 302(b).
172. Id. at § 302(c).
173. Exec. Order No. 11,063, § 303, 3 C.F.R. 655 (1959-63). Nowhere in Title
VI is an individual granted standing to press his claim directly in the courts, or in the
alternative, to press his claim with any effectiveness before a single executive agency.
Nor does the order empower the agency to grant specific relief to the complainant.
174. Section 101 of the order directed all departments and agencies in the execu-
tive branch of the Federal Government "to take all action necessary and appropriate
to prevent discrimination in housing on account of race, color, creed or national origin."
Part II of the order empowered such agencies to issue rules and regulations to effectuate
the purposes of the order. Exec. Order No. 11,063, 3 C.F.R. 653 (1959-63).
175. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (1970).
176. 37 Fed. Reg. 811 (1972).
177. Id.
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portance of advising complainants of the alternative remedies-sections
1982, 3612 and 3610(d), state and local fair housing laws-that are
available to them.178 If a 3610 complainant also files suit under sec-
tion 3612, HUD can continue efforts to achieve voluntary compliance
until such suit comes to trial. 79 The victim of discrimination thus
has three alternative routes to the vindication and enforcement of the
federal fair housing laws: (1) judicial, (2) administrative and (3)
concurrent judicial and administrative proceedings. Through a judi-
cious choice of alternatives, the complainant may avoid the pitfalls in-
herent in following any one remedy exclusively.
Private Litigation v. The Administrative Complaint
The effectiveness of the complaint resolution procedures outlined
above is exemplified by an analysis of the disparity of redress in judicial
litigation as opposed to administrative complaint processing. Judicial
relief has been sought rather infrequently in most parts of the country.
This fact may be attributable to the high cost of initiating such actions, to
the reluctance of attorneys to handle such time-consuming and unpopular
litigation, or to the fact that lawyers in most parts of the country obtain
a significant proportion of their fees from service to the real estate in-
dustry.' s0 For these reasons the administrative procedures under Ti-
tle VIII provide certain advantages. They are low in cost (and there-
fore available to the poor), the filing process is simple (a telephone
call and brief visit can begin the process thereby making it available to
the unsophisticated and uneducated) and, finally, there is more flexi-
bility in the type of relief available.""1
The system is no panacea, however, because of some very impor-
tant weaknesses. For the individual in need of immediate housing, the
administrative process is of little practical assistance. It takes HUD,
with its limited personnel resources and armed only with the powers of
conference, conciliation and persuasion, an average of five months to
process a complaint from the time of receipt to final conciliation.'
82
By that time the desired housing has long since been occupied by
others.
178. TITLE VIII HANDBOOK, supra note 153.
179. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(f) (1970); 24 C.F.R. § 105.31 (1972).
180. Hearings on De Facto Segregation and Housing Discrimination Before the
Senate Select Comm. on Equal Educational Opportunity, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 5,
at 2915 (1970).
181. Harvard Note, supra note 5, at 846.
182. U.S. CoMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVI RIGHTS ENFORCEmENT
EFFoRT: ONE YEAR LATr 57 (1971).
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Another problem that is shared with parties seeking relief in court
is that of a bona fide purchaser. Under Title VIII the person who pur-
chases or rents the property in question before the issuance of any
court order under section 3612(c) or section 3610(d), and without
knowledge of the complaint or civil action, is protected from divest-
ment.183 Although section 3614 of Title VIII directs the courts to as-
sign section 3612 suits for hearing at the earliest practical date and to
expedite the suit in every possible way, 184 there is still the very real pos-
sibility that the desired housing will already be sold, rented or otherwise
disposed of by the time any litigation reaches final judgment.
The question then centers around the purpose and value of the
complaint resolution enforcement procedure. In theory they should be
utilized to carry out the public policy against discrimination which
particularly seeks: (1) to secure the desired housing for the aggrieved
party, (2) to compensate the victim for his losses, including his efforts
in attempting to vindicate his legal rights, (3) to detect, correct and
prevent discriminatory housing practices, (4) to achieve a substantial
increase in housing opportunities for minorities, and (5) to achieve
residential integration. In spite of the obvious drawbacks to seeking
judicial redress, private litigation appears preferable to administrative
remedies for obtaining the complainant's primary goals, housing and
compensation. However, private civil litigation seems particularly ill-
suited to achieve the other goals because of high court costs, the com-
plexity of litigating a successful suit, and the uncertainty of an award
of attorney fees.
An Evaluation of the Administrative Complaint Procedure
Notwithstanding the long delays associated with the administrative
complaint procedure, it would appear to be a more suitable instrument
to attack continuing discriminatory practices, to open housing oppor-
tunities for minorities and to integrate communities-goals less impor-
tant from the complainant's point of view, but more important in
terms of national policy. HUD might negotiate, for example, impor-
tant affirmative action programs that would increase the housing avail-
able to minorities and promote residential integration. The various
mechanisms necessary to achieve these goals are already in existence,
but experience under Title VIII shows a slow rate of progress. In
1970, for example, a total of only 1,025 complaints were received by
183. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a) (1970).
184. 42 U.S.C. § 3614 (1970).
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HUD. During that year, a total work load of 1,429 complaints185 re-
sulted in only 389 attempted conciliations, 169 completed conciliations,
and only 89 successful conciliations.'8 6 In 1971 the number of Title
VII complaints rose to 1,570. During that year, out of 1,209 clos-
ures, there were 204 successful conciliations from a total of 351 com-
pleted conciliations.1
8 7
In contrast, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), which administers a very similar procedure for complaints
regarding employment discrimination, during its second year of opera-
tion in 1966 received a total of 6,133 complaints of employment dis-
crimination. In 1970, out of more than 14,000 complaints and 1,179
conciliations, there were 613 successful conciliations.
88
How can the large disparity in the complaint activity between the
two agencies be reconciled? Experience indicates that people seeking
housing have a more immediate need than individuals seeking em-
ployment, and they are not willing to undergo the long delays and un-
certainties involved in the administrative complaint procedure in order
to secure the desired housing or remedy.8 9 Both the EEOC and
HUD are understaffed, which may partially explain the long delays in-
volved in the administrative processes. In 1970 the EEOC had 544
staff members handling complaints nationwide. 90 In 1971 it was re-
ported that HUD had only 42 staff members nationwide handling Title
VIII complaints.' 91 Without enough people to handle the volume of
complaints received, the respective agencies are unable to build public
confidence in their ability to carry out statutory mandates.
185. The workload of complaints for a particular year can be greater than the
number of complaints received because of cases carried over from the previous year.
186. HUD, 1970 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 85 (1971). The former Assistant Secre-
tary for Equal Opportunity, Samuel J. Simmons, defined a "successfully conciliated
complaint" as "one in which the complainant and the person charged with discrimina-
tion come to an agreement on an appropriate remedy for the alleged discrimination
which not only provides relief for the individual complainant, but provides for affirma-
tive action to eliminate the cause of discrimination." Simmons Marks Fourth An-
niversary of Fair Housing Law, HUD News Release, 1972.
187. Simmons Marks Fourth Anniversary of Fair Housing Law, HUD News Re-
lease, 1972; interview with Mrs. Laura Spencer, supra note 40. Three year totals,
1969-1971, for Title VIII complaint processing (derived from the above sources) are
3577 complaints received, 388 successful conciliations, 739 attempted conciliations.
188. EQUAL EmPLOym:ENT OPPORTUNITY COM'N, FiFm ANNUAL REPORT 30, 36
(1971).
189. U.S. COMM'N ON CVm RiRTS, FEDEmRAL CIVm iRRGHS ENFORCEmENT EF-
FORT 146 n.58 (1971).
190. Id. at 99 n.634 (1971).
191. U.S. COMM'N ON CIvIL RIGHTs, Tmr FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT
EFFORT ONE YEAR LATER 43 (1971).
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It is impossible to estimate the total number of new housing op-
portunities for minorities that have been created as a result of 388 suc-
cessful conciliations achieved by HUD in the three years from 1969 to
1971.192 Similar obstacles are encountered in attempting to measure
the impact of the overall effort by HUD on the frequency or extent of
housing discrimination. However, the low number of complaints and
the low percentage of successful conciliations would indicate that the
administrative complaint procedure has not been a particularly effi-
cient or effective means of enforcing fair housing laws or of eradicating
the widespread housing discrimination outlined above. Implicit in
this result is the conclusion that the private complaint resolution pro-
cedures, both judicial and administrative, are ineffective in accom-
plishing either the reasonable goals of the injured complainant or the
national policy behind them.
Public Remedies
To what existing processes, then, may the nation turn to alleviate
housing discrimination and attain the national goal of a decent home
for every American family? It may look first to existing statutory al-
ternatives providing for action taken directly by the government with-
out the necessity of inspiration from private citizens. These remedies
include both public judicial suits and administrative action.
The United States attorney general is empowered by the various
fair housing laws to bring both civil and criminal actions to enforce
their provisions. Many of these laws now lie dormant, but some have
provided the wherewithal for making significant headway in civil,'93
criminal'94 and administrative areas of this particular body of law.
Title VIII is paramount among the more often used provisions. In
addition to providing criminal sanctions, it furnishes the basis for vari-
ous administrative measures that are designed to combat discrimination
in housing. Before examining developments in these two areas, it is
helpful to have an understanding of the role Title VIII plays in public
civil litigation.
192. See note 187 supra.
193. E.g., Executive Order 11,063 empowers the attorney general to bring civil
actions in cases referred by other agencies or departments of government. Exec. Or-
der No. 11,063, § 303, 3 C.F.R. 655 (1959-63).
194. E.g., Executive Order 11,063 also provides for criminal action by the attorney
general. Id. The attorney general is empowered to criminally prosecute anyone who
interferes with a person in the exercise of such person's rights protected by Title VIII.
42 U.S.C. § 3631 (1970). The penalty upon conviction is a fine of $1,000 or one
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Suits by the Attorney General
Section 3613 (a) of Title VIII provides for the initiation of civil
suit by the attorney general in cases involving a "pattern or practice"
of discrimination or a denial of Title VIIrs rights which raises an "is-
sue of general public importance." 19 5 Much attention has been focused
on the limits of the attorney general's enforcement power under Title
VIII. Most of the discussion in judicial opinions, however, has cen-
tered on the meaning of the term "pattern or practice" and has largely
ignored any evaluation of the power of the attorney general to institute
civil actions where an issue of "general public importance" is in-
volved.19 6 The meaning of the term "pattern or practice" is derived
from the legislative history of Title VIII. 97  It was considered that a
"pattern or practice" of resistence to Title VIII rights would exist only
when there was more than an isolated or sporadic incident of housing
discrimination. In positive terms, a "pattern and practice" of discrimi-
nation would consist of repeated, routine, concerted, or persistent inter-
ference with Title VIII rights.'9 "
The federal courts have followed this guidance, holding that a
"pattern or practice" of discrimination was not established by an iso-
lated, accidental or peculiar incident."99 The courts have not estab-
lished, as a matter of law, a minimum number of discriminatory acts
year imprisonment or both unless bodily injury results, in which case the fine is
$10,000 and the term of imprisonment is ten years. Id. As yet, however, no case
law has developed under this statute.
195. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1970). Section 3617 authorizes civil actions to prevent
intimidation or interference with rights protected by Title VIII. The one recorded
case brought under section 3617, People v. Davis, 411 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1969), is not
very enlightening, however.
196. An examination of over 30 cases of the more than 150 in which the attorney
general has filed a civil action against an alleged violator of Title VIII reveals that
each case rested on the theory of "pattern or practice." None were based on the
theory that the case raised an issue of "general public importance." See e.g., United
States v. Luebke, 345 F. Supp. 179 (D. Colo. 1972). Nevertheless, suits of general pub-
lic importance are tools deserving of exploitation in spite of their present nonuse
status, especially against large land developers or lending institutions.
197. Hearings on the Proposed Civil Rights Act of 1967 Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1967).
This analysis was presented to the subcommittee by the administration of President
Lyndon B. Johnson.
198. Id.
199. United States v. Mayton, 335 F.2d 153, 158-59 (5th Cir. 1964); United
States v. Gray, 315 F. Supp. 13, 19-22 (D.R.I. 1970). Compare United States v. Bob
Lawrence Realty, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 870 (N.D. Ga. 1970) with United States v.
Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305, 1313-15 (D. Md. 1969).
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which establish the existence of "pattern or practice."2 °0  Conse-
quently, the existence of a "pattern or practice" of discrimination in
housing must be approached from the perspective of the parties in-
volved.
20 1
Moreover, the term "pattern or practice" may not be capable of
precise definition. An examination of the cases reveals that the attor-
ney general may not initiate a civil action on behalf of an individual
complainant on the basis of a single act of discrimination in housing.
202
On the other hand, it may be possible for the Justice Department to in-
tervene in a civil suit for a single act of discrimination and from there
develop a "pattern or practice" claim.
2 03
Responsibility for the Department of Justice's enforcement effort
of Title VIII rests with the Housing Section of the Civil Rights Divi-
sion. 0 4 In order to utilize its resources efficiently, the Housing Sec-
tion has developed a list of target metropolitan areas which have sig-
nificant concentrations of minority group members.20 5  Since January
1969 the Justice Department has instituted or participated in eighty-
five Title VIII actions against 250 defendants in twenty-two states.
Furthermore, the department has negotiated several hundred out of
court settlements of such suits. 2°  In 1970, for example, forty-nine
"pattern or practice" suits were instituted in twenty-one states. 0 7 The
majority of these were successfully presented, eighteen of them result-
ing in consent decrees. 08
The enforcement effort of the attorney general has been ham-
200. One court held that "[t]he number of incidents necessary to show a pattern
or practice depends upon the nature of the right protected and the nature of the
ordinary violations of such right." United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305,
1313-14 (D. Md. 1969).
201. See United States v. Mitchell, 327 F. Supp. 476, 480-83 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
202. E.g., United States v. Gray, 315 F. Supp. 13, 22 (D.R.I. 1970). However, an
individual's rights under Title VIII are not affected by a Justice Department suit.
See Boyd v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 790 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
203. See United States v. Gilman, 341 F. Supp. 891, 905-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1970).
204. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT
160 (1971).
205. In addition to the obvious choices such as San Francisco and New York,
this list includes areas such as San Antonio, Texas, and San Diego, California, which
have large Mexican-American populations. Id. at 161 n.162.
206. Statement by President Richard M. Nixon on Federal Policies Relative to
Equal Housing Opportunity, News Release, June 11, 1971.
207. Twenty-two of the forty-nine suits involved discrimination in the rental of




pered by the small number of attorneys (twenty) assigned to handle
Title VIII suits. As a result, the Justice Department has had to rely
upon outside sources as their primary means of detecting patterns and
practices of housing discrimination. 20 9 One such source has been
HUD, which referred twenty-one complaints of Title VII violations to
the Justice Department in 1970 and fifteen complaints in 1971.210
The potential impact of this type of litigation on the problem of dis-
crimination in housing could be significant. Consider, for example,
the far reaching effect that suits against owners of very large rental
complexes would have not only on the units in question but also as
precedents for similar future actions. The Justice Department recently
instigated two such actions, one in New York against the owner of
some 21,000 housing units, and the second in Los Angeles against the
owner of an 8 to 9,000 unit complex.21" '
Public Administrative Remedies
Title VHI and Executive Order 11,063 authorize agencies and
departments to develop programs to further the purposes of the na-
tional policy of fair housing. They also direct these entities to coop-
erate with HUD in effectuating the fair housing laws.21 2  The coopera-
209. See FnnERAL CVIm RiGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra note 204, at 161.
See also U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIvm RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT
EFFORT: SEVEN MONTHS LATER 37 (1971).
210. Interview with Mrs. Laura Spencer, supra note 40. The United States
Commission on Civil Rights has concluded that the Housing Section of the Justice
Department has made "strategic and effective" use of its limited resources in enforcing
the law. FEDERAL Cvim iGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra note 204, at 160.
The Civil Rights Commission contends that the Justice Department has been insuffi-
ciently concerned with the problem of housing discrimination against minorities other
than Negroes and points out that it has instituted only one such case since July 1970.
THE FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT EFFORT: SEVEN MONTHs LATER, supra note 209, at 37.
The National Committee against Discrimination in Housing, however, contends that
even though almost all of the "pattern or practice" suits have been successful, these
actions have resulted in only a negligible increase in housing opportunities for minority
citizens. The successful suits have generally involved housing available only to middle
or upper income families. Moreover, the Justice Department has failed to create
effective means of insuring continuing compliance with its consent decrees, an important
area to which future efforts might be directed. Hearings on DeFacto Segregation and
Housing Discrimination Before the Senate Select Comm. on Equal Educational Oppor-
tunities, 91st Cong. 2d Sess., pt. 5, at 2916 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on
DeFacto Segregation].
211. United States v. Lefrak, No. 70-CIV-964 (E.D.N.Y., filed August 6, 1970);
United States v. Ben Weingart, No. 70-530-e (C.D. Cal., consent decree entered
July 29, 1970).
212. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(c) (1970); Exec. Order No. 11,063, 3 C.F.R. 654 (1959-
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tive ventures usually take two forms, affirmative action programs and
follow up compliance reviews.
An important additional remedy that promises to be useful in
assaulting the broad problem of discrimination in housing is the af-
firmative action program. Executive Order 11,063, Title V121 and
Title VIII, 214 direct all departments and agencies involved in federal
housing programs to issue rules and regulations implementing the re-
quirement of non-discrimination in their respective areas of responsi-
bility. "Affirmative action" may best be understood as the adoption of
administrative policies and procedures which further the national policy
of fair housing.
HUD's Affirmative Action Programs
HUD has several affirmative action programs. 21 5 In 1972, HUD
issued guidelines regarding real estate advertising which conform with
the governing section of Title VIII. 216  These guidelines were provided
as a standard for the industry and as a basis for negotiating affirmative
action agreements.21' In the same year HUD promulgated Alfirma-
tive Fair Housing Marketing Regulations requiring participants in
FHA Housing Programs to undertake marketing policies designed to
attract buyers and tenants from all segments of the community.18
These regulations were an important recognition of the existence of a
dual housing market which required affirmative efforts on the part of
the government to be eliminated. Under the regulations, all applicants
for FHA programs involving the development or rehabilitation of sub-
divisions, multi-family projects and mobile home parks of five or
213. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1970).
214. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3608(d)(5) (1970).
215. Former HUD assistant secretary for Equal Opportunity, Mr. Samuel J. Sim-
mons, stated in 1972 that enforcement efforts of HUD had been centered around the
processing of complaints but that now HUD would be widening the scope of its en-
forcement activities through affirmative action policies and programs. Simmons Marks
Fourth Anniversary of Fair Housing Law, HUD News Release, 1972.
216. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1970) with 37 Fed. Reg. 6700 (1972).
217. The guidelines suggested a number of specific types of advertisements that
constitute discriminatory advertising practices, such as (1) use of words or visual aids
having a discriminatory effect; (2) selective use of advertising media in order to reach
only a specific portion of the community thereby having a discriminatory effect;
(3) the exclusion of minority persons as models in advertisements. The guidelines also
offer suggestions for methods of insuring equal opportunity in advertising, such as the
use of "Equal Housing Opportunity" logotypes, slogans or statements, and the use of
human models which indicate that the advertised housing is available on an open
occupancy basis to all races. 37 Fed. Reg. 6701 (1972).
218. 37 Fed. Reg. 75 (1972).
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more housing units were required to submit to HUD affirmative fair
housing marketing plans.219 Such plans would typically include: (1)
advertising the availability of housing through minority publication out-
lets throughout the marketing area, particularly those designed to reach
members of minority groups; (2) requiring the use of "Equal Housing
Opportunity" logotypes in all advertising; (3) requiring the use of
models in advertising which depict both majority and minority group
members; (4) non-discriminatory hiring policies in the employment
of salesmen or rental agents; and (5) display of 'Equal Housing Op-
portunity" posters in conspicuous positions on the project site.
220
Failure of the FHA program participant to comply with these reg-
ulations would result in debarment and the institution of civil pro-
ceedings by the Department of Justice under Executive Order 11,063,
Title VI and Title VIII.2 21 These regulations, if actively enforced,
would undoubtedly increase housing opportunities for minority citi-
zens; however, they would still leave relatively untouched the huge con-
ventionally financed housing market. Moreover, these efforts are not
even directed towards such goals as the development of low and mod-
erate income housing in suburban areas. Comparable efforts by HUD
are called for with respect to privately financed housing.
22 2
HUD has also begun to increase public awareness of the fair
housing laws. This effort is an important step in the larger problem of
eliminating racial discrimination in housing. Public education in this
area has been greatly enhanced by HUD regulations requiring real es-
tate offices, apartment rental agencies and real estate brokerage ser-
vices to post an approved "Equal Opportunity" poster. The poster
bears a list of discriminatory housing practices prohibited by Title
VIII and also contains the following statement: "We do business in
accordance with the Federal Fair Housing Laws. 12 3  Failure to dis-
play the poster is considered prima facie evidence of a discriminatory
housing act.
224
219. Id. at 75-76.
220. Id.
221. See text accompanying notes 248-251 infra.
222. HUD has not exploited its potential and real powers under section 3608.
Through use of these powers it could enforce many sanctions similar to those
available for Title VI violations under the 1964 Civil Rights Act. See text accom-
panying notes 243-251 infra.
223. 37 Fed. Reg. 75 (1972).
224. Id. at 3429. A very real danger implicit in this HUD practice is that opera-
tors in the housing industry may by display of posters come to be treated as in prima
facie compliance with the fair housing law, although they do nothing to end discrimina-
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HUD has also begun to advertise in both Spanish and English for
the purpose of increasing public awareness of Title VIII rights. This
campaign on both television and radio advertises a toll-free telephone
system allowing complainants to contact HUD 24 hours a day.
22 5
Naturally, this advertising campaign serves to further the much needed
objectives of educating the public generally and informing potential
complainants that a remedy exists.
In addition to the above measures, HUD has taken other affirma-
tive steps. HUD administers its programs in a manner which promotes
residential integration and the availability of low and moderate income
housing in newly developing areas. For example, a new criterion for
the evaluation of preliminary applications for water and sewer facilities
awards points for the availability of housing to low and moderate in-
come families on a non-discriminatory basis.226
In June, 1971 HUD proposed new criteria for the selection of sites
for federally assisted 27 and FHA subsidized2 28 lower income housing
projects. 229 "Superior" ratings will be awarded to project areas located
outside of present or potential minority group concentration. "Super-
ior" ratings will also be given to areas in which less than 15 percent of
the total number of housing units in the neighborhood will be sub-
sidized housing and which are readily accessible to places of employ-
ment in the area. This selection system will give higher priority to
those projects proposed to be located outside the central cities. 3°
Affirmative Action in Other Federal Agencies
Other federal agencies have also developed affirmative action pro-
grams. The General Services Administration (GSA) has recently
agreed to participate with the FHA in the selection of sites for federal
tory practices or to improve housing opportunities for minorities. Indeed, the poster
requirement without more, may merely conceal the discriminatory practice beneath
another layer of covert non-compliance which is beyond the detection of the ordinary
minority consumer. If steps are not taken to guard against this danger, the effort to
end housing discrimination may be crippled.
225. Simmons Marks Fourth Anniversary of Fair Housing Law, HUD News
Release, 1972.
226. HUD Regs., 24 C.F.R. § 556.10 (1972).
227. U.S. Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970).
228. National Housing Act of 1937, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1715L, 1715z-1 (1970).
229. HUD Proposal Project Selection Criteria, 36 Fed. Reg. 12032 (1971).
230. In this regard, the influence of restrictive land use controls in suburban
areas is extremely pervasive. The interaction between the fair housing laws and land
use controls exercised under the police power will be the subject of a separate article
by the author in the near future.
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installations. 23 1 On June 12, 1971, GSA and HUD executed a memo-
randum of understanding concerning low and moderate income hous-
ing. Under this agreement the two agencies will insure the availability
of housing on a non-discriminatory basis to low and moderate income
employees of new and relocating federal facilities.232 If a community
selected for the location of a federal installation does not have an ade-
quate supply of housing or if housing is not available to minority
citizens, HUD and GSA may undertake an affirmtaive action program
with the assistance and cooperation of the selected community to cor-
rect the housing situation before or in conjunction with the opening of
the facility.233  These efforts will provide tremendous incentives
toward integration because of the great economic impact that such site
selections have upon an area. This, it may be anticipated, should be a
very viable force in opening new housing opportunities for low and
moderate income families in selected metropolitan areas.234
The Need for Stronger Control of Financial Institutions
A major area where efforts to eliminate racial discrimination in
housing can be made is in the regulation of financial institutions. The
proportion of the mortgage market held by the FHA and VA has
diminished significantly since World War II, and today most housing is
financed by conventional mortgage loans from commercial banks, mu-
tual savings banks and savings and loan associations. 23 5 These institu-
tions are heavily regulated by the federal government through the Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board, Comptroller of the Currency, Federal
Reserve System and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
These agencies employ some 3,600 examiners who visit member lend-
ing institutions on a periodic basis. These examiners represent a sig-
nificant potential source of civil rights compliance officers; however,
they are not presently used in this capacity.236 Of the four agencies,
231. Site selection is the responsibility of the GSA. 36 Fed. Reg. 23642 (1971).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 23644.
234. See U.S. CoMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL INSTALLATIONS AND EQUAL
HOUSING OPPORTUNTrY (1970). In February of 1970 President Nixon issued Execu-
tive Order No. 11,512 which ordered that the availability of low and moderate income
housing be considered as a criterion in choosing a community as a location for a
federal installation. Under the guidelines of the Executive Order, the impact that the
selection of the site will have upon the improvement of "the social and economic con-
ditions in the area" is regarded as a significant factor in the decision requirements.
Exec. Order No. 11,512, 3 C.F.R. 525 (1972).
235. FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEmmNT EFFORT, supra note 204, at 105.
236. 1d. at 169. -
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only the Federal Home Loan Bank Board requires its member insti-
tutions to collect racial and ethnic data on all mortgage loan applica-
tions."' Without such information it is impossible to determine
whether a "pattern or practice" of discrimination exists in transactions
involving homes financed by a nonfederal mortgage lending institution.
While these institutions have implemented some programs pur-
suant to the mandate of the fair housing laws, their impact on discrimi-
nation in the housing market has been minimal. The Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation requires its member banks (which are not mem-
bers of the Federal Reserve System) to display an "Equal Opportunity
Lender" poster in their lobbies.231 8 The Federal Home Loan Bank
Board has adopted the same requirement.23 9 Also, the four agencies
have sent questionnaires to member institutions to determine current
policies of mortgage-lending institutions toward minorities and the ex-
tent of discrimination in the financing of housing.240 It is imperative
that action be taken on these vital initial measures to build a compre-
hensive program that will insure compliance by the private housing
market-that is, by pinching pocketbooks.
In this regard the government could stand some internal house-
cleaning of its own. The VA, which administers a loan program
guaranteeing 3 billion dollars in mortgage loans annually,241 has only
one professional in San Francisco regional offices assigned to insure
that the VA's programs are administered in accordance with the fair
housing laws. These programs to end discrimination in home financ-
ing are woefully inadequate and cannot be relied upon to meet prob-
lems of the purchase or resale of homes by minorities.
It is apparent that in many areas the government has only acted
recently, and it may be too early to judge the value of the new efforts.
However, the program's movement has been slow and ineffective, even
allowing for the late beginning. Stronger efforts are called for if the
government is to combat the discriminatory practices that now exist in
many parts of the country.2
42
237. See ONE YEAR LATER, supra note 191, at 67.
238. 37 Fed. Reg. 8908 (1972). The dangers inherent in the poster practice are
great unless coupled with requirements of substantive affirmative programs, such as
those that are voluntarily carried out by Bank of America. See note 242 infra.
239. 37 Fed. Reg. 811 (1972). Both agencies also require the appearance of the
"Equal Housing Lender" slogan, logo or equivalent statement in the advertising of home
financing services by member institutions.
240. ONE YEAR LATER, supra note 191, at 67, 70, 72, 74.
241. Id. at 62, 66.
242. At least one private commercial bank, the Bank of America, has initiated its
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HUD Compliance Reviews
On May 13, 1971, HUD issued revised regulations for the en-
forcement of the Title VI requirement of non-discrimination in federal
housing programs. These regulations provide a second device for the
enforcement of Title VI by the Assistant Secretary of Equal Opportu-
nity of HUD. That device is the processing of compliance reviews.243
Compliance reviews are periodic, in-depth investigations into the
practices of recipients of federal financial assistance to determine
whether or not they are complying with the requirements of Title
VI. 24 4  Compliance reviews became prominent in 1971 when the
United States Commission on Civil Rights reported that the program
assistant secretaries had not been conducting compliance reviews of ap-
plications for federal financial assistance.2 45  Until May 1971, these
compliance reviews and on-site investigations had been conducted only
in connection with an investigation of a complaint.2 46  According to
HUD, compliance review activities were to be stepped up in 1970 with
154 compliance reviews of particular programs and 26 city-wide com-
pliance reviews.241
Until HUD issued its directives in May 1971, there was confusion
regarding the responsibility for conducting Title VI compliance re-
views. Was the responsibility with the various Assistant Secretaries or
was it with the Secretary for Equal Opportunity? This confusion
own corporate affirmative action program. In July 1968 Bank of America established
a New Opportunity Home Loan program. The Bank committed 100 million dollars to
the program in mid-1968 and the same amount in mid-1971. By mid-1971 more than
6,000 families had acquired homes under the program. The beneficiary families were
low income and minority who otherwise probably could not have obtained home loan
financing. Interviews with C.E. McCarthy, Vice President, Real Estate, Bank of
America, in San Francisco, Cal., August 1971; George A. Skogland, Senior Vice Presi-
dent, Bank of America, in San Francisco, Cal., August 1972; Walter White, Manager,
Avalon-El Segundo Branch (Watts), Bank of America, in Los Angeles, Cal., August
1971 and August 1972.
243. 24 C.F.L §§ 1.1-.12 (1972). Section 1.4 sets out a list of "specific dis-
criminatory actions" which are prohibited by Title VI. This list provides some stand-
ards by which the practices of a recipient may be evaluated. Section 1.5 requires that
all recipients of federal financial assistance submit assurances that the housing program
or activity will be administered or operated in compliance with the federal require-
ment of non-discrimination.
244. HUD, EQuAL OPPORTUNrrY HADBoox 7 (September 1971). See also 24
C.F.R. § 1.7 (1972).
245. FEDEAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra note 204, at 159.
246. ONE YEAR LATER, supra note 191, at 42.
247. FEDERAL CsVIL RGttTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra note 204, at 159.
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caused the enactment to be a virtually ineffective mechanism for ending
discrimination in federally supported programs. After May 1971, Title
VI became a relatively effective statute, its effectiveness attributable
mainly to compliance reviews.
The enforcement power of HUD is substantial in relation to Title
VI violations. As discussed before, Title VI allows HUD to terminate
or refuse to grant or continue federal financial assistance to those re-
cipients who failed to comply voluntarily with the non-discrimination
requirement.248 The only situations in which this sanction, called "de-
barment," has been used have involved local public housing programs
where authorities have failed to submit acceptable tenant selection or
assignment plans. There have been ninety such debarments. 249  Be-
yond this, however, HUD efforts are almost nonexistent. In Novem-
ber of 1971, the Civil Rights Commission reported that HUD has never
in the history of Title VI terminated assistance because of discrimina-
tory acts in violation of Title VI.250
One obvious problem with the present enforcement mechanism
for Title VI is that the application of the sanction of debarment may
actually injure those parties which the federal requirement of non-dis-
crimination is supposed to aid. For example, the termination of funds
for public housing projects or urban renewal programs because of dis-
criminatory practices would delay the development of much needed
housing for low income families, both white and nonwhite. Although
the application of the sanction of debarment may stem further racial
residential segregation to a degree, it will also delay or perhaps deny
the acquisition of better low-cost housing by minority families. Hous-
ing, though located in areas of high minority concentration, would
otherwise be unavailable.
Compliance reviews are techniques that lend themselves to other
possible uses. For example, HUD can determine whether there is
compliance with federal orders, negotiated affirmative action agree-
ments or specific conciliation agreements. Other agencies may also
conduct compliance reviews to determine whether their regulated busi-
nesses are complying with fair housing laws.25' This technique is ob-
viously still in its infancy and could be an extremely effective instru-
ment in the effort to attain national fair housing goals.
248. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1970). See also 24 C.F.R. § 1.8 (1972).
249. FEIYERAL CivIL RIGHTs ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra note 204, at 159.
250. ONE YEAR LATER, supra note 191, at 42.
251. See 42 U.S.C. § 3608(c) (1970).
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Recommendations for Change
In light of the deficiencies in existing programs, certain recom-
mendations can be made for constructive change consistent with the
purpose of improving the efforts to achieve the national policy against
discrimination in housing. This reconsideration of alternatives to ex-
isting programs is not new. For example, Senator Sam Ervin, speaking
of the legislation which eventually became Title VIII of the 1968 Fair
Housing Act, stated that if it were enacted the Fair Housing Act would
"only bring false hope and engender further frustrations in those who
are deluded about its effect and purpose."2 52  Commentators noted
shortly after passage that Title VIII was "the result of a political com-
promise, a product more of the desire for passage than a desire for a
rational scheme for uprooting discrimination, 253 and questioned
whether Title VflI would be more than a "temporary sedative" for Ne-
gro frustration. 25 4  Examining the experience of the government's ef-
fort to enforce its new policies, various bodies have reaffirmed these
early doubts as to the effectiveness of the existing fair housing laws.
For example, the Commission on Civil Rights concluded in 1970 that
the results of the fair housing effort "after two years of experience
under Title VIII are disappointing," and that "[t]he denial of equal
opportunity in housing . . . remains a severe and persistent prob-
lem ' 25 5 Sol Rabkin and Richard Bellman of the National Committee
Against Discrimination in Housing (NCDI-) contend that the present
system of fair housing enforcement with its reliance on individual
complaints and pattern and practice suits is "at best a mere palliative
which fails to respond effectively to the fundamental problem, opening
up the previously existing patterns of lily white suburbs and city neigh-
borhoods to the minorities confined in local ghettos. ' 25 6 Even former
HUD Assistant Secretary for Equal Opportunity, Samuel J. Simmons,
admits that the existing fair housing program is "only a beginning" to
the achievement of the goal of equal housing opportunities. 7
252. Hearings on the Proposed Civil Rights Act of 1967 Before the Subeomm.
on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm. 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 59
(1967).
253. Harvard Note, supra note 5, at 835.
254. Duke Comment, supra note 5, at 771.
255. FpEERAL CVIm RIGTS ENFoRcEMmNT EFFORT, supra note 204, at 14, 40, 176.
256. Hearings on DeFacto Segregation, supra note 210, at 2916.
257. Address by Samuel J. Simmons, Ass't Sec. for Equal Opportunity, HUD, at
the 3d Annual Conference, National Neighbors, at Morgan State College, in Baltimore,
Maryland, in HUD News Release, June 9, 1972.
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Proposed Changes in Title VI
The following proposed changes to Title VIII are aimed at making
the law a more effective instrument for the attainment of stated policy
objectives. Furthermore, the changes would eliminate inconsistent and
conflicting policy assumptions reflected, for example, in subsection
3603(a)(1), 2 1s which prohibits discrimination by race in certain hous-
ing categories, and subsections 3603(b)(1) and (2) which permit ra-
cial discrimination in the sale or rental of certain housing categories.25
In addition, changes are recommended in the nature of available relief
for an injured complainant and in the mechanisms for enforcement by
the courts and by HUD.
The scope of Title VIII should be expanded to eliminate the ex-
emptions that were written into the law in 1968. The act left three
important gaps in its coverage: section 3603(b) 260 permits discrimi-
nation under prescribed conditions in (1) single family houses,26 1 and
(2) in buildings containing four or fewer independent living units, 262
and section 3607 exempts housing operated by religious organizations
and private clubs.263 It should be noted that discriminatory advertising
in the first two categories is prohibited.2 64 This prohibition represents
a tacit recognition of the impact of such discrimination if left entirely
unchecked. Finally, since section 1982 probably makes conduct other-
wise condoned by the Title VIII exemptions illegal,265 those first two
exemptions established by section 3603 (b) should be removed to pro-
tect the unwary property owner from practicing apparently legal but
in fact illegal discrimination.
The exemption section of Title VIII, section 3607, permits dis-
criminatory practices by religious organizations in that preference may
258. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(a)(1) (1970).
259. 42 U.S.C. §H 3603(b)(1), (2) (1970).
260. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (1970).
261. Discrimination is not prohibited in the sale of single family homes if: (1)
the landowner does not own more than three such homes or any interest or right to
the proceeds from sale or rental of more than three such homes at any one time;
(2) the landowner, if not resident in or the most recent owner of the home, makes
no more than one sale within any twenty-four month period; (3) after December 31,
1969, the sale or rental services of a real estate agent or employee are not used and
there is no publication, after notice, of any discriminating advertisement or written
notice. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1) (1970).
262. The families must live independently of each other, and the landowner must
actually maintain and occupy one of the living quarters as his residence. 42 U.S.C.
§ 3603(b)(2) (1970).
263. 42 U.S.C. § 3607 (1970).
264. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1970).
265. See text accompanying notes 115-119 supra.
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be given to members in noncommercial housing. The only qualifica-
tion of the exemption is that membership in the religion must not be
racially restrictive. 66 A preference for members of the particular re-
ligion as allowed by the statute therefore may not be properly charac-
terized as otherwise illegal discrimination. However, the exemption
permits private clubs not open to the public to give preferences to
members in its noncommercial housing that is operated as an incident
to its primary purpose.267 Such an exemption permits otherwise illegal
discrimination. In regard to the exemption applicable to private
clubs, the statute does not contain the restrictive qualification which is
imposed upon religious organizations.268 Thus a religious organiza-
tion which discriminates in its membership on account of race, color
or national origin will lose its exempt status, but a private club which
follows a similarly discriminatory membership policy will not lose its
exempt status under section 3607. This gap with respect to private
clubs should be closed. Since there is no valid reason why private
clubs should enjoy a privileged status of exemption over other organi-
zations, including religious organizations, section 3607 should be
amended to include the phrase "unless membership in such private
clubs is restricted on account of race, color, religion, or national ori-
gin."
The Use of "Testers"
National policy recognizes the widespread existence of economic
subterfuges to conceal acts of discrimination. President Nixon has
stated that federal government enforcement will not accept the use of
economic measures or other deceptive tactics to disguise the practice
of housing discrimination. 69 To achieve these policy and statutory ob-
jectives the statute on fair housing should be amended to expressly al-
low citizens to determine whether or not various segments of the hous-
ing industry are practicing housing discrimination.2 70  A federal court
has held that verification of racial discrimination by whites who as
"testers" attempt to obtain housing solely for the purpose of verifying
racial discrimination is not legally objectionable and may not be re-
266. 42 U.S.C. § 3607 (1970).
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Statement by President Richard M. Nixon on Federal Policies Relative to
Equal Housing Opportunity, News Release, June 11, 1971.
270. The practice by which the determination is made has become popularly
known as "testing."
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garded as entrapment.27' Other courts have also given judicial ap-
proval to "testers" as evidentiary aides for "aggrieved persons. 272
However, these groups should not be compelled to find an "aggrieved
person" in order to object to the illegal practice. Since "the evil is the
denial of equal opportunity" in housing,273 it should make no differ-
ence that the individuals who discover the violations are not seeking
housing for themselves, but for others. Nor should it make a differ-
ence whether the party who exposes the illegal housing practice has
made a bona fide offer or "is doing it simply to determine whether his
right to equal opportunity in housing, as well as the rights of others in
his class, are being violated.
274
Improvement of Effectiveness of Private Remedies
Private redress may be strengthened by clarification of judicial
remedies and by the delegation of power to HUD to carry out its
congressional mandate of spearheading the implementation of the na-
tional policy against housing discrimination. Conflicts in the law re-
lating to judicial remedies justify revision in the following three areas:
(1) statute of limitations for section 3610 and 3612 civil actions, (2)
271. Newbern v. Lake Lorelei, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 407 (S.D. Ohio 1968). The
court recognized that the offensive practice of discrimination had been verified by:
"a white person who 'masqueraded' as a buyer for purposes of testing the situation and
giving testimony. The defendants liken that to an informer in a criminal case.
However, even in a criminal case-let alone in a civil case-the testimony of an in-
former is competent (although it should be considered with caution), On Lee v. United
States, 343 U.S. 747, 72 S. Ct. 967, 96 L. Ed. 1270; and there is no entrapment if
the informer merely furnishes 'a favorable opportunity,' Lopez v. United States, 373
U.S. 427, 83 S. Ct. 1381, 10 L. Ed. 2d 462." 308 F. Supp. at 415.
"It is well settled that, in cases involving racial discrimination, the motives of the
victims are immaterial to the issue of whether or not the defendants violated the law.
In Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202 (1958), a Negro resident of Memphis 'tested'
the bus line. He was directed to the rear of the bus and sued to enjoin segre-
gated operation of the bus system. The district court found that he had never ridden a
Memphis bus before, that he owned a car and that "he was not a regular or even an
occasional user of bus transportation; and that in reality he boarded the bus for the
purpose of instituting this litigation ....... 3 RACE REL. L. REP. 743, 746 (W.D.
Tenn. 1958). On the basis of these facts, the district court dismissed the action. The
Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion summarily reversed, saying, "That the appellant
may have boarded this particular bus for the purpose of instituting this litigation is
not significant." 358 U.S. at 204.
272. See, e.g., Bush v. Kaim, 297 F. Supp. 151 (N.D. Ohio 1969); Harris v.
Jones, 296 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Mass. 1969); Bell Realty & Ins. Agency v. Chicago
Comm'n on Human Relations, 130 Ill. App. 2d 1072, 1079, 266 N.E.2d 769, 774
(1971). See also Mitchell v. Quain, No. 70-C-1640 (N.D. Ill., March 30, 1971).
273. Hearings on DeFacto Segregation, supra note 210, at 2918.
274. Id.
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scope of jurisdiction of federal courts, (3) nature and scope of relief
available through the courts.
Statute of Limitations
A problem with the statute of limitations arises only because Title
VIII provides alternative methods of initiating claims. Under section
3612, a plaintiff apparently has 180 days within which to file a
claim. - 5  However, there appears to be no bar to his pursuit, at the
same time, of an administrative remedy under section 3610.276 How-
ever, if he initiates HUD action seeking an administrative remedy first,
there is some question whether this administrative action will operate
to toll the statute on his section 3612 claim. Present decisional law
holds that it does not.2 7" There is a rational justification for this re-
sult, since the courts have held that the rights created by the two sec-
tions are alternative.2 78  Thus, the pursuit of a remedy under one sec-
tion does not affect the operation of the other, nor the rights of the
parties thereunder. However, a complainant who relies first on the
3610 administrative process and who is not informed of the significant
differences in available remedies under the two sections 79 may later
find himself unable to pursue his section 3612 judicial remedy if the
administrative efforts fail to successfully resolve the complaint.
Moreover, the time within which an action must be initiated un-
der section 3610 is unclear. The statute seems to provide that a com-
plainant must file suit with an appropriate court within thirty days after
the secretary is unable to obtain voluntary compliance, if he is unable
to obtain such compliance: (1) within thirty days of the filing of the
claim with the secretary or (2) "within thirty days after expiration of
any period of reference [to a state agency] under [Section 3610] (c) .1280
This provision appears to limit the time for bringing a section 3610 ju-
dicial claim to sixty days after the date of filing of the complaint with
HUD absent HUD's referral of the complaint to a state agency. At
most, the claimant is given sixty days to initiate judicial action in addi-
tion to the deferral time, that is, the time during which the state agency
has had the complaint. This literal interpretation, of course, would
severely restrict HUD's ability to investigate and conciliate claims. In-
275. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a) (1970).
276. See Brown v. Ballas, 331 F. Supp. 1033, 1035 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
277. See id. at 1035.
278. Brown v. Lo Duca, 307 F. Supp. 102, 103-04 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
279. See text accompanying notes 290-296 infra.
280. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(d) (1970).
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deed, it would virtually put them out of the conciliation business.
Moreover, it would further confuse the issue of whether and when the
statute would run on the complainant's right of action. Under this in-
terpretation the time between the discriminatory event and the expira-
tion of the right of action would fluctuate depending upon two varia-
bles: (1) the elapsed time between the discriminatory event and the
filing of a HUD complaint and (2) the state agency deferral time.
To foreclose the complainant's judicial remedy because of his prior
reliance on the administrative process seems unjust. Yet, that result
would be highly probable if the literal wording of the statute were
strictly applied.
By interpretation the courts may overcome the effects of this ap-
parent statutory trap. Assuming that the complainant files a civil ac-
tion under section 3612, the court could continue his case to give HUD
time to obtain voluntary compliance. However, assuming that the
complainant has not filed a civil action under either section and has
instead sought only administrative relief, the courts could do one of
three things when the civil action is finally filed. First, they could
hold that the period for filing section 3610 actions, like section 3612
actions, is 180 days after the discriminatory event. This result, how-
ever, would be in direct contradiction to any plausible interpretation
of the statute and a departure form the evident statutory intention to
provide alternative procedures. Second, the court could, as some
courts have done,28 1 hold simply that the complainant has thirty days
within which to file his action after the administrative process ends
and he is given notice by HUD that its efforts have ceased. Third,
the court could allow the filing of a section 3612 action at any time
prior to the time that HUD terminates its efforts in a 3610 administra-
tive action, including the thirty day period following notice that HUD's
efforts have failed. This would allow complainants time to file a 3612
civil action to protect their interest upon their initiation of a 3610 HUD
complaint, without the penalty of loss of a right to sue because HUD
takes more than 180 days to decide that it cannot resolve the com-
plaint.
282
281. Brown v. Ballas, 331 F. Supp. 1033, 1036 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
282. Section 3612(a) seems to assume this power in a complainant when it pro-
vides "[that the court shall continue such civil case brought pursuant to this section or
section 3610(d) of this title from time to time before bringing it to trial if the court
believes that the conciliation efforts of the Secretary or a State or local agency are
likely to result in satisfactory settlement of the discriminatory housing practice.
42 U.S.C. § 3612(a) (1970).
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This problem with section 3612 is a result of the difference in
available remedies between sections 3610 and 3612. The most notable
difference is that 3610 fails to provide for damages, while 3612 allows
both punitive and compensatory damages.28 3 If Title VIII were modi-
fied to allow the same remedies, irrespective of whether an action is
brought under 3612 or 3610, the ill effects of the difference in the
statute of limitations under the two sections would be removed insofar
as such ill effects work to the disadvantage of complainants whose civil
actions are not brought within the 180 day limitation of 3612 actions.
As the law stands today, the complainant who chooses to rely on HUD
risks the loss of a valuable statutory remedy, namely 3612. If the sec-
tion 3610 remedy were strengthened to attain a level of equality with
the 3612 remedy, the complainant who opts to rely upon HUD would
suffer no later harm for his failure to pursue a timely judicial remedy.
Therefore, such an amendment to Title VIII would remove a serious
disincentive to the use of the administrative processes of HUD.
Another method by which the section 3612 problem could be
remedied is an amendment of Title VIII to specifically provide that
the running of the statue on the complainant's claim is tolled under
both sections 3612 and 3610 at the time a complaint is filed with
HUD. The converse should also be true. The statute of 180 days for
filing a complaint with HUD284 should be tolled upon the filing of a
complaint with an appropriate court, so that the complainant is not
compelled to forego an administrative remedy because he first pursued
a judicial remedy. In conclusion, section 3610 and 3612 remedies
should be equivalent, the 3610 administrative complainant should not
be subject to the thirty day statute until he has received actual written
notice, and all statutes of limitations should be tolled by commence-
ment of any action under 3610 or 3612.
Scope of Jurisdiction
The scope of jurisdiction of the court over section 3610 claims is
limited to those respondents who were named in the HUD complaint.
28 5
This restriction should be eliminated to allow the court discretion in
determining which respondents the complainant might properly pro-
ceed against. Most often the HUD complaint is filed without legal ad-
vice. A layman cannot be reasonably expected to make a proper choice
283. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970) with id. § 3610(d).
284. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(b) (1970).
285. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(d) (1970). See Brown v. Ballas, 331 F. Supp. 1033,
1035 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
January 1973] FAIR HOUSING
of defendants for a possible future lawsuit. Yet if he fails at this stage,
he may later be foreclosed from pursuing a proper defendant. On the
other hand, failure to name a defendant may deny him the chance to
appear and defend himself during the HUD proceedings. By permit-
ting judicial discretion in this area both parties could be protected.
A further problem remains with respect to plaintiffs. At present,
access to the enforcement machinery of the federal government is lim-
ited to "persons aggrieved," which is further defined as (1) persons
who claim "to have been injured by a discriminatory housing prac-
tice" or (2) persons who believe they "will be irrevocably injured by
a discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur." These two
categories of persons apparently are the only ones who have standing
to bring claims under Title VIII.286  "Aggrieved persons," however,
need not be the targets of the discriminatory act. It is enough if the
complainant suffered some harm. Under Title VI persons other than
"direct victims" of housing discrimination may file a complaint with
HUD.2 s7  The same is true of Title VIII complainants. -88  Moreover,
the Supreme Court has held that standing under the 1968 act is "as
[broad] as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution . . .insofar
as tenants of the same housing unit that is charged with discrimination
are concerned. 289  While standing under the act is admittedly broad,
it is still not clear whether interested housing groups and other such
parties may complain of instances of discrimination in housing and ob-
tain injunctive relief if they are unable to allege that they have suf-
fered some specific harm. Yet these groups could make a valuable
contribution towards the elimination of discrimination. Expansion of
standing to other than "aggrieved persons," or merely a broader inter-
pretation of that term, would permit a greater utilization of the re-
sources and expertise of the nation's many fair housing councils in
ferreting out housing discrimination.
Nature and Scope of Relief
The difference in the nature and scope of relief available under
section 3610 and section 3612 actions may be seen from the following
comparison. Injunctive relief, both temporary and permanent, is avail-
able under either section. 290  The court can, under section 3610,
286. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1970).
287. 24 C.F.R. § 1.7(b) (1972).
288. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 93 S. Ct. 364 (1972).
289. Id. at 367.
290. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610(d), 3612(c) (1970).
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probably award attorney fees but apparently cannot award punitive
or compensatory damages. 29 1 Under section 3612 the court may ap-
point counsel,292 award attorney fees to a non-indigent victorious
plaintiff,293 award compensatory damages 94 and award up to $1,000.00
in punitive damages.2 95 Affirmative action may be ordered by the
court under either section.
-2 96
The great disparity between the nature and scope of relief availa-
ble under the two sections constitutes a further disincentive for the use
of HUD's administrative process under section 3610. Congress should
amend Title VIII to permit the court to award similar relief under
either section. This would serve two important purposes. It would
increase the incentive to use HUD's procedures and would increase the
availability of private litigation as a means of furthering national policy
against discrimination in housing. It is difficult to justify the denial of
comparable relief to an individual who has chosen to file a complaint
with HUD before seeking judicial relief, when because of HUD's in-
ability to resolve the complaint he is subsequently forced to seek judi-
cial relief under a 3 610(d) civil action.
Similarly, a victorious plaintiff under 3612 should be allowed rea-
sonable attorney fees whether or not he is able to assume said fees.
The adoption of this amendment would more clearly permit the courts
to apply the doctrine of "private attorneys general" to section 3612 ac-
tions. 9 7 The award of counsel fees could then be made as a matter of
course in all fair housing litigation as it now is in sections 3610 and
1982 litigation. 98  Moreover, such an amendment would make Title
VIII remedies more analogous to remedies available under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It is evidently congressional policy
that litigation should be a means of furthering the national fair housing
policy.299 These proposals would make section 3610 and section 3612
enforcement tools available for those individuals who otherwise would
be reluctant or unable to assume the high cost of bringing a civil action
291. See text accompanying notes 145-147 supra.
292. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(b) (1970).
293. Id. § 3612(c).
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. " he court may grant as relief, as it deems appropriate any. . . other order
.... ." Id. § 3612(c) (1970). "[Tlhe court may . . .order such affirmative action
as may be appropriate." Id. § 3610(d).
297. See text accompanying notes 120-145 supra.
298. See text accompanying notes 120-126 supra.
299. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 93 s. Ct. 364 (1972).
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to vindicate Title VIII or section 1982 rights. Furthermore, private at-
torneys might be more willing to accept such suits on a contingency
fee basis, if they were reasonably assured of some compensation for a
victorious claim.
New Powers for HUD
HUD should be transformed into a more effective enforcement
agency of fair housing laws. At present the enforcement powers of
HUD are too limited and ineffectual. HUD is called upon to settle
disputes touching the most sensitive and fundamental interests with
only the powers of "conference, conciliation and persuasion." With
such limited powers it is not surprising that HUD settles few disputes
and effects only slight compliance with Title VIII.3 0° The problem of
a lack of adequate enforcement power is not new to federal agencies
dealing with discrimination. It dates from 1964, when Congress cre-
ated the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to resolve com-
plaints involving employment discrimination.3 0 1 Upon creation, Con-
gress provided that agency with only the powers of "conference, concili-
ation and persuasion. 302  It has been suggested, and properly so, that
the 1968 act which gave HUD powers similar to those given to the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission evidenced a deliberate
policy to give the two agencies analogous enforcement powers.
30 3
But in March of 1972, Congress enacted the Equal Opportunity Act
of 1972,30 which added to the vague powers held by the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission since 1964. Now that commission
may file civil actions on behalf of a complainant if the commission is
unable to achieve voluntary compliance.30 5
Similarly, Title VIII should be amended to augment HUD's en-
forcement powers. Complaint processing should be an efficient low
cost method of furthering national policy by resolving individual com-
plaints of discrimination. But it is not. To make it so, HUD should
be given the power (1) of immediate jurisdiction (even where state
law is substantially equivalent), (2) of compulsory process (to compel
the respondent's participation in the settlement process), (3) to tem-
300. See text accompanying notes 148-192 supra.
301. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15 (1964).
302. Id. § 2000e-5(a).
303. Harvard Note, supra note 5, at 838.
304. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 104 (codified in
scattered sections of 5, 42 U.S.C.A. (Pamp. July 1972)).
305. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Pamp. July 1972).
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porarily enjoin the parties from altering the status quo (while HUD's
efforts are continuing), (4) of adjudicatory proceedings (the powers
to make findings of fact after its investigation and after it has heard
from both sides, to determine the applicable law, and to decide the dis-
pute absent voluntary settlement), and (5) to order binding resolution,
subject to judicial review. In the alternative, HUD, like EEOC, should
be authorized to bring civil actions on behalf of complainants for the
purpose of obtaining judicial resolution where voluntary resolution is
unavailable. The adoption of either alternative would increase the
probability that an individual's complaint could be effectively and
quickly resolved, and most important, that the dwelling desired by the
complainant could be preserved and secured.
Conclusion
Congress apparently recognizes its goal to provide a "decent home
and a suitable living environment for every American family" as a con-
tinuing responsibility. Almost annually since 1949, it has taken an
additional stride towards that goal by the enactment of new or amend-
atory legislation. Seemingly Congress has responded to the revealed
need of the times. The courts too have regarded the numerous housing
enactments of Congress as an evolving plan to provide a decent home
for every citizen. The federal fair housing laws are an essential ele-
ment in the congressional plan. Thus, whatever may have been the
practice in the past, activities in contravention of that plan may not
now be tolerated, if the goals of the plan are to be attained. In the
year 1973, the evil at which the plan is aimed remains for many
Americans. For them, the noble aims of their government have no
meaning. While the fair housing laws as now framed may go far
towards altering this circumstance, it is impossible for them to com-
plete the job of eradicating impermissible discrimination from our so-
ciety. Indeed the proposals for improvement of the fair housing laws
may not complete the job. But a congressional response to this re-
vealed need will carry forward its evolving plan of taking the steps nec-
essary to free American society from the debilitating effects of racial
discrimination.
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